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THE ATTACK SCENARIO
A city is experiencing an increasing number of seemingly random incidents. A major financial institution suffers
system failures, sending shockwaves through the markets. Workers struggle to keep the public transportation
system operating as critical control systems fail. Social media reports of terrorist attacks incite panic. The city’s
first response capability begins to strain. Regional medical facilities are at capacity. The media struggles to
inform an increasingly concerned public. Elected leaders and emergency response leadership gather in the city’s
emergency operations center to analyze the situation and respond.
A sinister reality emerges when a foreign terrorist group claims that the city is under siege from cyberspace.

1. INTRODUCTION
This report summarizes the U.S. Army Cyber
Institute’s (ACI’s) work to date on Jack Voltaic (JV), a
research project that focuses on critical infrastructure
and public-private partnerships (PPPs). JV research,
which includes contributions from academia, industry,
and government, explores how to synchronize
Department of Defense (DoD)/U.S. Government and
private sector capabilities in a cyberspace attack
response. JV is a research framework that enables
the Army to recognize the impacts of cyberspace
operations from a municipal and critical infrastructure
perspective.
Now more than ever before, the need for
infrastructure resilience is extremely important.
Digital connectivity makes our infrastructure more
efficient and, simultaneously, more vulnerable.
However, critical infrastructure need not be connected
to the Internet to be vulnerable. Cyberspace attacks
rarely affect a single target. Instead, unanticipated
effects often ripple across interconnected
infrastructure sectors. Varying defensive capabilities
and authorities complicate the response. If exploited
by a determined adversary, these unidentified gaps
leave the Nation vulnerable. By simulating attacks on
the infrastructure critical to a city’s functioning and by
examining the reactions of infrastructure owners and
operators, emergency services, and security officials,
the JV experiment/exercise environments served to
create new data and datasets that the Army can use
to assess the consequences of cyber incidents.
JV began as a way to explore implementing “cyber
mutual assistance,” a concept stemming from
longstanding energy sector practices.1 Within the
energy sector, mutual assistance provides a common
1

framework for electrical utilities to use in mobilizing
assets and capabilities from across the Nation to
respond to a major incident, such as a natural disaster
that causes widespread power outages.
The ACI, which has conducted JV research for the past
3 years, performed cyber exercises JV 1.0 in New York
City (NYC) 29-31 August 2016 and JV 2.0 in Houston
24-26 July 2018.
Through the JV project, the ACI, alongside its
assembled partners, aims to identify gaps, identify
interdependencies among critical infrastructure
sectors, and provide recommendations for
improvement. JV also provides an innovative, bottomup approach to critical infrastructure resilience. The
ACI, an organization within the DoD and Federal
Government, serves primarily as an advisor and
facilitator in these exercises/experiments. Because
the ACI is recognized for its roles in academia and
in providing strategic-level thinking, it is an ideal
organization for instilling trust and facilitating the
involvement of participants from multiple sectors.
This report highlights the value of the ACI’s JV
research to local municipalities, their infrastructure
partners, the Army, the DoD, and the Nation. It is
critical that the ACI share in an open and transparent
way the lessons learned from JV, both to raise the
quality of discussions and debate around these
issues and to improve the resilience of the critical
infrastructure that the DoD relies on to defend the
Nation and conduct military operations.

Jonathon Monken, Fernando Maymi, Dan Bennett, Dan Huynh, Blake Rhoades, Matt Hutchison,
Judy Esquibel, Bill Lawrence, and Katie Stewart, Cyber Mutual Assistance Workshop Report,
Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute, 2018, available from
https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/SpecialReport/2018_003_001_513596.pdf.

RESEARCH SUMMARY
The ACI’s JV research enables the Army to explore
cyberspace operations from the perspective of a
municipality and in conjunction with the web of
infrastructure sectors that make that city function.
JV 1.0 was the first step in building a framework for
preparing for, preventing, and responding to multisector cyberspace attacks on major cities. JV 2.0
explored the employment of the total Army force to
defend the Nation in the face of an advanced physical
and cyberspace attack on a major U.S. port city and
the cyber resilience and readiness of Army-operated
Defense Critical Infrastructure to support military
force projection and sustainment from the port city.
Because the purpose of the JV research framework
is to iterate multiple exercises – some with similar
characteristics and some with different ones – in
order to build pictures of the various impacts and
interdependencies that knit cities together with their
infrastructure partners, JV 2.0 naturally built on the
experiences and insights gained from JV 1.0.
As a direct result of JV 2.0 research, the 2019 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 1649,
directed the DoD (Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense and Global Security) to implement
a pilot program that would simulate cyberspace
attacks on critical infrastructure in order to identify
and develop means for improving DoD responses to
requests for defense support for civil authorities in
response to such attacks.
The JV project’s strategic impact shows that the
highest levels of government recognize the Nation’s
need to establish preparedness for inevitable national
disasters and cyberspace attacks through these
exercises. The aftermath of tragic events highlights
the necessity of sectors such as first responders and
emergency management to share their information
for public safety. JV provides a forum where
stakeholders can meet in a low-threat environment,
instead of waiting for a catastrophic event such as
9/11 to forge these critical relationships and organize
their responses.
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1.1. The U.S. Army Cyber Institute (ACI)
at West Point
The ACI conducts high-quality research on the
Army’s most critical cyber-related challenges
to bridge gaps by performing outreach and to
promote information exchange across Army,
military, academic, industry, and government cyber
communities. The ACI supports the Army and
the Army’s cyber community in providing future
recommendations and their current implications.
The ACI analyzes today’s public and private trends
in technology and talent management development
to be prepared for tomorrow’s challenges.
Our efforts support the force proponent with
insights and recommendations. Our research will
enable programs to plan for future threats and
possibilities, and the partnerships we develop
through our work will enable collaborative efforts
going forward.
The mission of the ACI is to be a national resource for
interdisciplinary research, advice, and education in
the cyber domain, engaging DoD, Army, government,
academic, and industrial cyber communities in
impactful partnerships to build intellectual capital
and expand the knowledge base for the purpose of
enabling effective Army cyber defense and operations.
Defense of the Nation depends on the ability to
rapidly process and share information. Modern
communications process most information through
the Internet, which is mostly privately owned and
operated and used by for-profit organizations, notfor-profit organizations, academic institutions, and
government agencies for research, commerce, the
provision of services to citizens, and the sharing
of information. The Army must partner with these
outside entities to develop solutions for operating in
this space that support our national defense.

1.2. ACI Partnerships
The ACI accomplishes its mission by working with
partners on problems of mutual interest. Preparing for
and preventing future cyber conflict requires publicprivate work by experts on critical topics which can
facilitate future successes. Academic and industrial
partnerships allow the ACI to work with experts from
across multiple communities in support of research
critical to the cyber community.

6 JACK VOLTAIC
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of insightful military, government, and industrial
leaders.2 Additionally, in cooperation with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Cooperative Cyber
Defense Center of Excellence, the ACI helped bring
a premier cyber conference, CyCON U.S., to the
United States.3
Specific to the JV project, the ACI has developed
critical infrastructure industry partnerships, which are
described in the following sections.

1.2.1. Importance of JV

Figure 1: The Cyber Defense Review

The greatest challenge facing the ACI is identifying
future threats to the cyber community before they
can negatively impact our military forces or partners.
To do so, we must leverage the collective research and
development (R&D) of our industrial base as well as
collaborate with the owners of our country’s critical
infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). The ACI
partners across academia, industry, and government
to create teams of experts who work together on the
toughest problems facing these communities. Like
those working at the entrepreneurial edge, much of
our work may only be appreciated in hindsight.
The ACI aims to create knowledge, expand
understanding of the cyber domain, and develop
partnerships. Leveraging our like-minded allies
across the domain requires a community devoted to
the study of cyber conflict. The ACI has supported
the creation of this community by developing The
Cyber Defense Review, a journal that shares peerreviewed research and the professional commentary

The JV research project demonstrates the value of
research on developing and leveraging strategic
partnerships. JV, one of the ACI’s first codified
partnership efforts with industry, involved a
multidisciplinary problem set consisting of legal,
policy, and physical incident response challenges
combined with a cyber live-fire training exercise on
a network. The project, which served as a proof of
concept exercise in defending the Nation, entailed
understanding the role of the military in addressing
a cyberspace attack as well as identifying the gaps
and redundancies within response measures. This
is important because JV can be used to formulate
long-term plans for assessing DoD installations and to
ensure that the United States can project power when
its critical infrastructure is under duress.
In addition to benefiting the DoD, the JV research
project provides important benefits to civilian
industries – particularly, critical infrastructure
owners and operators. An inadequate response to a
cyberspace attack undermines public trust in industry
and could damage companies’ reputations, hurt shortterm profits, erode their market share, and increase
the demand for government regulation of their
industries.
Finally, because the JV research project demonstrates
dependencies and vulnerabilities, it enables cities and
municipalities to understand their own capabilities
as well as those of their infrastructure partners.
Participants from various organizations were able to
meet and exchange contact information in a calm,

Army Cyber Institute, The Cyber Defense Review, available from
https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/The-Journal/Publications/.
3
Army Cyber Institute, “CyCON U.S.,” available from https://cyber.army.mil/Events/CyCON-US/.
2
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low-threat environment and prospectively identify
whom to call in a time of crisis. Beyond merely
developing critical personal and organizational
relationships, the participants became better able to
understand the worldviews, expectations, interests,
capabilities, and limitations of the organizations they
might have to work with in a “Cyber Worst Day”
scenario. The JV exercise also helps cities comply with
local, state, and Federal Government regulations for
conducting multiple types of emergency exercises at
a single time. The exercise design utilized in JV could
serve as a foundation for developing a comprehensive
framework for responding to a future cyberspace
attack.

1.2.2. Innovate, Experiment, and Partner
The ACI is charged with providing innovative ideas to
the Army, the DoD, and the Nation in order to address
future cyber-related challenges. The ACI leverages
partners to enable opportunities and evolve the
capability and capacity of its cyber force.
On April 8, 2016, the ACI hosted a cyber mutual
assistance workshop (CMAW) led and facilitated by
the ACI, the Electric Infrastructure Security Council,
and Carnegie Mellon University.4
The CMAW, which was the initial phase of the
JV research project, provided an opportunity for
experts and practitioners from the public and private
sectors to examine cyber mutual assistance using
a holistic approach and sharing capabilities and
issues concerning the energy sector. The CMAW also
spawned the idea to develop an experiment.
During a cyberspace attack, the most likely response
would involve coordination through federal entities,
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs),
Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations
(ISAOs), and intelligence fusion centers. However,
the management and command and control (C2)
structures and processes of these organizations
are still being defined and are at varying levels of
maturity and capacity.5,6 Similarly, fusion centers
vary in their commitment to cybersecurity and their
interconnectedness with their communities. As such,
similar incidents could play out quite differently across
the country, or across industries.
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Figure 2: Mr. Andrew Natoli (left) and
Dr. Brian H. Nussbaum (right) participating in the JV 1.0 TTX

During the CMAW, the ACI used a cyber exercise to
examine mutual assistance from the angles of
preparation, prevention, and response. The research
objectives of the CMAW were the following:
• Define capability requirements for cyber;
• Discuss existing legal and operational frameworks;
• Develop partnerships;
• Develop a multi-sector exercise; and
• Define and plan a follow-on experiment to examine
interdependencies among critical infrastructure
sectors.

1.3. Partnerships Involved in JV Research:
Citigroup and AECOM
The ACI engaged Citigroup (Citi) and AECOM as coleaders in planning, developing, and executing JV 1.0
and JV 2.0, respectively. As leaders in their respective
industries, these organizations enhanced the research
effort by contributing additional perspectives and
expertise on critical infrastructure cybersecurity.
For JV 1.0, the ACI partnered with Citi because its
Global Cyber Threat Exercise Team (Citi-GCTET)
offered robust cyber exercise capabilities. CitiGCTET provided development, planning, execution,
reporting, and communication capabilities for
strategic, tactical, and technical cyber-threat exercises
and war games. Over the course of 4 months, the
ACI consulted with relevant federal, state, and local
entities to ensure realism, the inclusion of key players,
and sufficient granularity. This process contributed

Cyber Mutual Assistance Workshop Report, op. cit.
“National Council of ISACs,” National Council of ISACs Website, n.d., available from
https://www.nationalisacs.org/.
6
Department of Homeland Security, “Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs),” available from
https://www.dhs.gov/isao.
4
5
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to the eventual creation of the NYC Cyber Command,
a centralized organization leading the city’s cyber
defense and incident response.
Following the success of JV 1.0, the ACI team
developed a working partnership with the New York
State Governor’s office and the New York County
District Attorney. This continual partnership has
extended to the State University of New York at
Albany, the International Association of Fire Chiefs,
and the New York National Guard. Though these
efforts are just beginning, they will ultimately achieve
strategic initiatives to educate other communities
in cyber preparedness and response. This set of
partnerships and follow-on engagements, while
not one of the initial taskings of the JV framework,
demonstrates how organizations that share
overlapping goals, values, needs, and concerns
can benefit from meeting, operating together, and
learning from each other in an environment that lacks
the stress and tumult of a live incident.

Figure 4: CMAW attendees Tom O’Brien
and Jonathon Monken

2. JV RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
Over the course of 3 years, the ACI conducted two
experiments in the form of cyber exercises: the first,
JV 1.0 in NYC 29-31 August 2016, and the second, JV
2.0 in Houston 24-26 July 2018. Both JV events were
local and involved multiple critical infrastructure
sectors. In general, cyber exercises consist of a
tabletop exercise (TTX), a live-fire exercise (LFX), or
both, and incorporate a single sector or multiple
sectors. The following are identified scopes of
cyber exercises:
• International (e.g., Locked Shields, Crossed Swords,
and Cyber Guard)
• National (large-scale, distributed, and strategic –
e.g., Cyber Guard, Cyber Storm, and Cyber Shield)

Figure 3: CMAW Representative Bill Lawrence (Electricity
Information Sharing and Analysis Center/North American
Electric Reliability Corporation)

For JV 2.0, the ACI partnered with two companies,
AECOM and Circadence, to build on JV 1.0 and
expand the ACI’s knowledge of existing cybersecurity
capabilities and protection gaps. As co-lead, AECOM,
a global leader in critical infrastructure resilience,
conducted exercise and scenario development and
surveyed all critical infrastructure organizations
participating in the event. Circadence, a cuttingedge cybersecurity software development company,
provided the live, virtual, constructive environment.

• Regional (state, multi-state, or sector-specific;
distributed and often strategic – e.g., National
Guard Cyber Yankee event, Quantum Dawn, and
Grid-Ex)
• Local (usually conducted as a TTX or LFX within a
city or an organization)
Each category of cyber exercise is necessary and
serves a particular objective.

2.1. Experiment/Exercise Design Concept
The ACI, as referenced in figure 6, took a bottom-up
approach in developing the JV exercise by building a
team of experts in the field of critical infrastructure
before a scenario occurs, rather than the other way
around. Instead of being directed by higher levels,
each of the participants helped drive the scenario by
providing feedback about what areas they wanted to
focus on improving during the exercise.

RESEARCH SUMMARY
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isolated – and have widely different physical
geographies and industrial concentrations. As such,
cities have unique sets of threats, vulnerabilities, and
consequences that emerge in an analysis of cyber
incident response.

Figure 5: JV 1.0 LFX Red Team members, NYC (U.S. Military
Academy Faculty Team Officers in Charge and Cadet
Competitive Cyber Team)

Because a “Cyber Worst Day” scenario would likely
impact cities, JV considered local municipality
involvement in cyber exercises. Cities are interesting
actors in cyberspace because they vary widely – from
megacities to small cities, digital cities to those barely
computerized, regionally integrated to relatively

One of the key differences between JV and most other
national preparedness exercises was that JV focused
on areas of interest that were nominated by the
participants – that is, while these exercises featured
national-level capabilities and resources, they were
conceptually driven by the concerns of the cities and
their infrastructure partners. This approach makes
sense when the JV framework is viewed as a research
platform through which the ACI, the Army, and the
DoD harvest insights about their potential roles,
dependencies, partners, and requests that might be
made of them while allowing cities to take part in an
exercise that both meets their goals and helps them
discover needs.

Collect Data and Develop
Lessons Learned and
Recommendations
Conduct Simulated Cyber
Attack Experiment
Develop Governance
Hierarchy
Develop Simulated Cyber
Attack Experiment
Identify Public and
Private Partnerships
Identify Stakeholders

Component 1: Governance and
Planning Committee
Component 2: Tabletop Exercise
Component 3: Live-Fire Exercise
Category 1: Analysts and Operators
Category 2: Mid-Level Management
Category 3: Senior Executives
Develop Research Questions
and Focus Areas

Planning Committee

Critical Infrastructures

Figure 6: The ACI’s bottom-up approach in developing JV
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2.2. Components: Governance and
Planning Committee, Tabletop Exercise,
and Live-Fire Exercise
Three essential components comprised JV: the
Governance and Planning Committee, the TTX, and
the LFX. The Governance and Planning Committee,
which was the most critical component, brought
together representatives from sector-specific,
critical infrastructure organizations. The LFX and TTX
were cyber simulations that depended upon available
resources (e.g., employees) and capabilities (e.g.,
access to information technology (IT), operational

COMPONENT 1

Governance and Planning
Committee

technology (OT), and virtual range environments).
The LFX and TTX exposed participants to threat
tactics, tools, and shared techniques and improved
management’s awareness of the potential risks and
effects of a cyberspace attack.
Developing JV in this manner gave participants
in all three of the components an opportunity
to conduct collective cybersecurity training. The
training enhanced cross-sector information sharing
practices and helped facilitate technical-level threat
information sharing.

CORRELATE

COMPONENT 2
Tabletop Exercise (TTX)

COMPONENT 3
Live-Fire Exercise (LFX)

• Trusted agents
• Planners knowledgeable in cyber and
emergency planning procedures
• Members are representatives from
their respective sectors

Inspired by existing
exercise frameworks
LFX inspired by
• Category – 3: Senior Executives
U.S. Cyber
• Category – 2: Mid-level Management
Command exercises
• Category – 1: Operator and Analysts

Homeland Security
Exercise Evaluation
Program (HSEEP)
Consultation with DHS
National Cyber Exercise
Planning Program
(NCEPP)

Figure 7: JV components were inspired by existing exercise frameworks

2.2.1. Component 1: Governance and
Planning Committee
The Governance and Planning Committee is
comprised of representatives from sector-specific,
critical infrastructure organizations. Committee
members, also known as “trusted agents,” are key to
successful development and execution.
The planning committee held monthly planning
meetings and hosted bimonthly teleconferences.
Committee members leveraged the All Partners
Access Network, a collection of communities
developed to foster information and knowledge
sharing among the DoD, multinational organizations,
coalitions, and nongovernmental agencies that do not
have access to traditionally-restricted DoD networks.

Figure 8: JV 2.0 attendees (October 2017) - ACI initial
meetings with Texas Key Leaders, Houston

The ACI collaborated with participating sectors to
develop innovative ideas and objectives for exercising
a coordinated response to a catastrophic cyberspace
attack. The sectors involved in developing the JV

RESEARCH SUMMARY
exercises also participated in them. The intent was
for each sector to contribute to the creation of the
exercise. Although not every idea made it to the final
version of the exercise, this collaborative approach
helped the planning committee develop a scenario
around a simulated, catastrophic cyberspace attack
that was challenging and beneficial to all of the
participating organizations.
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management process addressed the potential control
measure hazards, aiming to reduce or eliminate
them. The LFX consisted of an on-range network,
virtual range environment that simulated critical
infrastructure environments to enhance the training
value. The LFX demonstrated the impacts of successful
attacks in an operational environment, including
explaining what worked for defenders.

2.2.2. Component 2: Tabletop Exercise (TTX)
The TTX was a facilitated discussion that took
participants through a scenario requiring them
to blend their physical disaster preparations with
cyberspace attack response procedures.
By bringing mid-level managers into a facilitated
discussion led by a moderator, the TTX helped leaders
assess their plans, policies, and procedures.
Additionally, the TTX helped familiarize participants
with the response process and enabled administrators
to gauge the effectiveness of their emergency
response practices.

Figure 9: JV 1.0 TTX, NYC

2.2.3. Component 3: Live-Fire Exercise (LFX)
The LFX was conducted on a simulated, virtual
environment to test cyber equipment and response
capabilities in real time. The LFX aimed to examine
and validate coordination and C2 among various
multi-agency coordination centers, such as emergency
operation centers.
The scenario for the LFX necessarily correlated
strongly with the one used for the TTX. The tactics,
techniques, and procedures employed during the LFX
were consistent with an exercise plan that included a
list of equipment and unit control measures, including
communication plans. During LFX planning, the risk

Figure 10: JV 1.0 LFX, NYC

The LFX targeted technical analysts and operators
and used opposing offensive and defensive teams in
various scenarios.
In building the LFX, a realistic training environment
was key to a successful exercise. The cyber range
needed to be sophisticated enough for the capabilities
of the participants. In order to research the OT
environment, the JV exercises used a simulated
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
environment, a system for remote monitoring and
control that operates over communication channels
using coded signals, including “OT” (network) and
“ICS” (industrial control system), which refer to
control networks. This setup allowed participants
to overcome their natural hesitation to talk about
simulation outside of their standard networks.

2.3. The Players/Participants
In general, there are three levels of participants
involved in a cyber exercise. These participants are
divided into three categories.
• Category 3: Senior executives and leaders.
• Category 2: Mid-level management, including firstline supervisors (e.g., TTX players).
• Category 1: Operational – analysts and operators
(e.g., virtual range/LFX players).
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Due to resource limitations and conflicting
commitments from stakeholders, JV 1.0 and 2.0
focused on categories 1 and 2, whereas an ideal
exercise would have brought in senior executives and
leaders as players, rather than as distinguished visitors
who only observed a small portion of the exercise.
Although JV was inspired by existing cyber exercise
frameworks, it was not restricted to any individual
framework. Cyber exercises can have a limited impact
on improving readiness because they have a tendency
to be either too technical or too high-level from a
policy standpoint. The goal of JV was to ensure that
the managers, operators, and technical personnel
were physically co-located and could interact with
each other to develop a common understanding of
the operational environment.
Both the LFX and TTX provided opportunities to
conduct collective cybersecurity training and to
enhance cross-sector information sharing. In JV 2.0,
both the LFX and TTX mimicked a real-world response
and required mid-level managers to disseminate
threat intelligence received from peer organizations
to operators as well as respond to threats detected
by operators. This approach ensured that the
exercise included collective cybersecurity training
and opportunities for cross-sector sharing (including
coordinated, technical-level threat intelligence
sharing) and that it facilitated the communication of
effects and risk with participating managers.

2.4. The Experiment/Exercise: JV 1.0 –
New York City

RESEARCH SUMMARY
it could be used to gain insights into the coordination
and collaboration that occurs in response to cyber
incidents. This framework is currently being further
developed among government, university, and
industry partners with the goal of exporting and
sharing it with other municipalities. While lessons
learned from individual scenarios or infrastructure
sectors may not be directly transferable to new cities,
the broad approach of simulating cyber incidents,
testing strategic and operational response capabilities,
and creating data and insights should be able to
improve processes across any jurisdiction or industry.

Figure 11: JV 1.0 Planning Committee members,
NYC (ACI and Citigroup)

JV 1.0 Planning Committee members were selected
from the emergency responder community and
included representatives from the financial services,
emergency services, communications, healthcare,
energy, and transportation systems critical
infrastructure sectors.

JV 1.0 was a relatively small exercise that
demonstrated a cyberspace attack in NYC impacting
multiple sectors and tested the city’s ability to
respond. First responders, emergency managers, and
workers from the transportation, telecommunications,
power, water, finance, and healthcare sectors took
part in the exercise.
The exercise had components occurring at both the
strategic and the operational levels. It included two
parallel tracks—an on-range network, defenderversus-attacker LFX, and a facilitated TTX with sector
leader participants—that focused on events occurring
in the virtual range play. The primary goal of the
experiment was to establish a framework for multisector cyberspace exercises for large municipalities,
to demonstrate this framework, and to test whether

Figure 12: JV 1.0 LFX Red Team members (U.S. Military
Academy Cadet Cyber Competitive Team, Simspace,
and other observers), NYC

The JV 1.0 TTX consisted of an informal, guided
conversation led by a moderator. The JV 1.0 LFX was
comprised of network defenders (the Blue Team)
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who defended information systems against a group
of mock attackers (the Red Team). The Blue Team
leveraged sensors and analysis tools on the range
to detect and respond to threat activities targeting
the defended network. The Red Team’s objective
for the exercise was to enable cyber resiliency by
improving enterprise information assurance and
incident response. The team did so by demonstrating
the impacts of successful attacks and allowing
defenders to identify best practices in an operational
environment. A third team, the White Cell, controlled
and facilitated engagement between the Blue and Red
teams and enforced the rules of the exercise.
The purpose of the research report was to shed
light on the common problem areas across multiple
infrastructure sectors and make recommendations
to other U.S. municipalities in order to improve
their resilience in responding to a natural disaster or
deliberate attack. Some findings of the JV 1.0 exercise
were considered sensitive and not releasable to the
public in an academic forum.

Figure 13: JV 1.0 LFX Red Team members (opposing force)
New York and Maryland National Guard, NYC

JV 1.0 simulated a hypothetical cyber event in NYC
involving a strategic, methodical attack by a notional
adversary occurring over 6 days. The first phase of
the attack impacted the financial sector through a
spear phishing attack targeting a business executive.
The second phase targeted the energy sector through
malicious software installed on a power company’s
network. The malware granted the attackers remote
access to the company’s power stations, which were
then used as a pivot point to further exploit and
compromise the city’s transportation tunneling and
signaling systems. This in turn led to the destructive
malware targeting the city’s water treatment plants.
Chaos was then simulated as the public became
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aware of the problems and coordinated physical
attacks began to unfold. Subsequent explosions and
active shootings across the city led to mass casualties
in the scenario.
A calamitous public response followed which was
amplified by the viral spread of disturbing videos and
images of the ensuing violence across social media.
The mobilization of fire and police departments was
severely impacted because the attacker encrypted
first responders’ critical systems using ransomware.

2.4.1. JV 1.0 Research Objectives
The main objective of JV 1.0 was to identify
a framework in which any city can rehearse
coordinated responses to cyber incidents that affect
multiple sectors. The exercise provided a venue in
which participants could gain exposure, train players,
and evaluate responses. The goal was to observe a
city’s ability to collaborate in a coordinated response
to a cyberspace attack. Table 1 outlines JV 1.0’s
research goals.
Furthermore, JV 1.0 explored a city’s existing
intelligence and information sharing capabilities
and encouraged the innovative development
of cybersecurity training exercises to match the
sophistication of contemporary cyber threats and
cyber environments. The exercise focused on a city’s
prioritization and coordination of recovery efforts
in order to identify interdependencies and analyze
potential gaps among sectors and outstanding
cybersecurity challenges.
Through JV 1.0, the ACI sought to identify strengths,
weaknesses, and best practices for improving systemwide security and incident response and to increase
awareness of and insight into the cyberspace attack
response challenges facing infrastructure sectors. The
ACI also sought to expose city officials and industry or
infrastructure partners to, and familiarize them with,
each other’s perspectives, processes, and response
capabilities. This was important because a more
realistic understanding of what partners bring to the
table can translate into more realistic planning that
better reflects real organizational capacities.
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JV 1.0 Research Objectives

1 Assess a city’s response capabilities through a multi-sector cyber exercise at the local level, including
intelligence and information sharing mechanisms, incident management structures, and decision-making
authorities and coordination.
2 Determine whether a city’s cyber crisis management planning is sufficiently integrated with physical crisis
management planning, including public, private, and public-private coordination, during a cybersecurity
crisis.
3 Develop a replicable framework for a city’s response to a cyberspace attack impacting multiple sectors.
Table 1: JV 1.0 Research Objectives

2.4.2. JV 1.0 Timeline
Midterm Planning
Meeting (MPM)
in Brooklyn, New
York, which included
NYC Emergency
Management,
to review the
JV scenario,
synchronize the
LFX and TTX, and
ensure a common
understanding of the
rules of engagement.

Cyber Mutual
Assistance
Workshop (CMAW)
at West Point,
New York, that
included the Electric
Infrastructure
Security Council
(EIS) and Carnegie
Mellon University.
APR

2016

MAY

2016

JUN

2016

Execution of JV 1.0 in
Palisades, New York,
at the Citigroup HNA
Palisades Conference
Center.

JUL

2016

AUG

2016

Final Planning
Meeting (FPM) in
Brooklyn, New York,
to conduct a final
review of the JV
scenario and discuss
action items raised
during the MPM.

Initial Planning
Meeting (IPM) at
West Point, New
York, which included
Citi-GCTET, to
develop the exercise
scope, scenario, and
objectives.

After Action Report.
Report on JV 1.0
lessons learned.

NOV

2016

DEC

2016

After Action
Meeting at
the Citigroup
Cyber Fusion
Center in
Warren,
New Jersey.

Figure 14: JV 1.0 Timeline

2.5. The Experiment/Exercise: JV 2.0 – Houston
Like its predecessor, JV 2.0 was a multi-sector,
public-private, cybersecurity research project that
culminated in a 3-day exercise. The exercise explored
how a large city would respond to simultaneous
physical and cyberspace attacks that impacted
multiple critical infrastructure sectors. The project
advisors included planners and operators from
multiple Army commands; major infrastructure
sectors; and various local, state, and federal agencies.
Figure 15: JV 2.0: Port of Houston
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JV 2.0 in Houston explored the employment of the
total Army force to defend the Nation in the face of
physical and cyberspace attacks on a large U.S. port city,
the cyber resilience of Army-operated Defense Critical
Infrastructure, and its readiness to project military power
and sustain operations abroad from the port city.

Figure 16: Senior leaders from public and private
organizations observed the exercise and discussed efforts
for improving cyber resiliency.

JV 2.0 integrated the defense industrial base sector
and involved seven additional critical infrastructure
sectors: emergency services, energy, healthcare and
public health, transportation, communications, water
and wastewater, and government facilities. JV 2.0
aimed to accomplish multiple shared objectives for
the ACI, U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), U.S.
Army North, and U.S. Army Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command (SDDC). In particular, it sought
to improve the Army’s overall awareness of cyber
threats and interdependencies as well as increase
Defense Critical Infrastructure resiliency. Through the
exercise, the Army would ideally be better informed to
develop future cyber capabilities, force structures, and
procedures for responding to cyber-physical attacks.
By bringing so many stakeholders together, the
exercise also contributed to the achievement of Army
and DoD installation mission assurance objectives.

The exercise enabled the Army to better understand
private sector and government responses and
procedures for identifying gaps and defending cyber
key terrain.
With an increased number of infrastructure sectors
and Army stakeholders represented, JV 2.0 provided
a more complex response environment and offered
new insights that built off of those gained from JV
1.0. The JV framework has proven to be sharable and
exportable, leveraging different insights depending on
where and by whom it is used.
A major addition for JV 2.0 was integrating the National
Guard due to the vital role it serves in the Nation’s
cybersecurity. JV 2.0 directly supported the National
Guard’s 2018 Cyber Strategy by enabling shared
situational awareness and response capabilities among
mission partners, working with federal agencies to
support and improve cybersecurity and resilience in
the homeland, engaging state mission partners to
secure and defend cyberspace, pursuing engagements
with public and private-sector mission partners, and
partnering with academia on mutually beneficial
training and research opportunities.
JV 2.0 centered around a hypothetical scenario
in which a hurricane and cyberspace attack
simultaneously struck in and around Houston. Technical
experts and executive leaders representing critical
infrastructure, regional emergency management, and
state and federal agencies collaborated on a TTX and
an LFX. During the TTX, facilitators guided discussions
on response actions and challenges. The LFX provided
a virtual cyber environment in which technical experts
tested their skills against adversarial threats.

2.5.1. JV 2.0 Research Objectives
The four main research objectives of JV 2.0 are
outlined in table 2.

JV 2.0 Research Objectives
1 Develop a framework in which to exercise a city’s ability to respond to a combined physical attack (e.g., a
natural disaster) and cyberspace attack affecting multiple infrastructure sectors.
2 Evaluate the cyber resilience of key Defense Critical Infrastructure in response to a combined physical and
cyberspace attack.
3 Evaluate and examine the military’s coordination process for providing cyber protection capabilities
requested by civil authorities, including the ability to communicate and share information among the city,
the private sector, and response partners.
4 Showcase the City of Houston as an emerging state and national leader in cyber incident response.
Table 2: JV 2.0 Research Objectives

16 JACK VOLTAIC
JV 2.0 examined the possible effects of cyberspace
attacks on a community’s infrastructure and
sought to identify how PPPs can enhance readiness
and resilience. To do this, the exercise explored
communication and collaboration methods among
civic officials; city agencies; the private sector; and
federal resource providers, such as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and
the military.
By showcasing the City of Houston, the JV 2.0 exercise
examined the existing incident response capabilities
of both the city and Harris County, including how
effective their coordination was across jurisdictions.
The ACI looked at various aspects of coordination,
such as how requests for support were made to
federal organizations, such as the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s (FBI’s) Cyber Analysis Team, and DoD
and National Guard Cyber Protection Teams.
Because the City of Houston recently endured
Hurricane Harvey, it was an ideal testing ground for
the objectives of JV 2.0. The city was interested in
increasing visibility of the importance of the Greater
Houston Region to the national economy, receiving
federal funding to improve its cybersecurity, and
highlighting the need for more resources. As an
exercise participant, Houston received credit for
conducting multiple types of exercises at one time
from the Texas Division of Emergency Management
and FEMA.

Figure 17: JV 2.0 TTX, Houston
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Through JV 2.0, the ACI aimed to help state and
regional civil officials better understand how to
leverage DoD and National Guard cyber capabilities to
protect public and private critical infrastructure. The
exercise had two main objectives: to examine how
DoD and National Guard cyber protection capabilities
could be integrated into a domestic response when
requested to do so by civil officials and to identify and
prioritize research necessary for enhancing the Army’s
readiness to support civil officials and defend
the homeland.

Figure 18: Lieutenant General (Ret.) Rhett Hernandez, U.S.
Military Academy Cyber Chair, provides opening remarks at
the JV 2.0 Legal Policy TTX in Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

At the conclusion of JV 2.0, the ACI was tasked with
providing ARCYBER recommendations on developing
cyber training objectives for the Army as well as for
developing strategies and procedures to help large
municipalities and critical infrastructure defend
against cyberspace attacks. The exercise explored
cybersecurity in ports and the integration of National
Guard cyber protection assets into a domestic
response to help ensure uninterrupted Army
force projection.

RESEARCH SUMMARY
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2.5.2. JV 2.0 Timeline

Planning Session with
AECOM to conduct
preliminary discussions
at AECOM offices in
San Antonio, Texas.
JUN

2017

JUL

2017

Technical Planning Session
at Texas A&M Engineering
Extension Service Emergency
Operations Training Center,
College Station, Texas,
to conduct collaborative
discussions among University
Partners - Texas A&M
University, University of
Houston, and University of
Texas at San Antonio - and
to learn about their existing
programs and capabilities for
integration into JV 2.0.
AUG

2017

Preliminary Planning
Meeting in San
Antonio, Texas, with
AECOM to learn
about local university
capabilities and how
best to leverage them.

OCT

2017

IPM with the City of
Houston and AECOM
at the University
of Houston to gain
concurrence on scope,
design requirements,
and conditions.
NOV

2017

Initial Meetings with
Texas Key Leaders in
San Antonio, Austin,
and Houston, Texas,
to conduct key leader
engagements for
commitment.

FEB

2018

Site surveys to identify
critical vulnerabilities with
sector representatives for
developing the scenario;
also, the MPM to conduct
a comprehensive review of
the scenario.
APR

2018

Army Stakeholders
Planning Workshop
at the Houston
Convention Center
to develop Army
objectives related to
JV 2.0.

MAY

2018

FPM at the Houston
Convention Center to
finalize the scenario,
further develop
exercise design
components, and begin
identifying TTX and
LFX players and the
Communications Plan.
JUN

2018

Legal/Policy TTX at
the United Service
Organizations Warrior
Facility at Ft. Belvoir,
Virginia, with military
stakeholders to clarify roles
and relationships during
a cyber incident response
and identify gaps in military
resources and authorities.

JUL

2018
Execution
of JV 2.0 at
the Houston
Emergency
Operations
Center.

Figure 19: JV 2.0 Timeline

2.6. Lessons Learned
The ACI gleaned lessons from JV 1.0 and JV 2.0 that
can help leaders at all levels improve their readiness
for a major cyberspace attack.
Political and civil agency leadership must broaden
their understanding of cyberspace from a static
domain centered on IT and cybersecurity architecture
and policies into a dynamic operational domain with
adaptive adversaries. Accordingly, political and civil
agency leaders should also have a broad range of
knowledge about the basics of IT across agencies and
sectors. A proper understanding of the ramifications
of a cyberspace attack requires that knowledge of a
given jurisdiction’s IT department be shared regularly
with the jurisdiction’s executive staff. Such information
sharing could take the form of advisory bodies,
brown bag lunches, or quarterly exercises. Ensuring
IT professionals can speak to executives in terms of
business risks and impacts will help executives have a
better understanding – if only at the strategic level –
of the impacts of cyber threats and incidents on their
operations. For example, before participating in a JV
scenario, sectors with antiquated systems that may
not be linked to Internet-based or
cloud-based systems may have a false sense of
security that they are not vulnerable to cyberspace
attacks. While some risks are reduced in that
situation, it is nevertheless important for the sectors
to avoid complacency since there are other ways that
they may be vulnerable.

Through the JV exercises, the ACI observed patterns
across multiple sectors that could apply to any city or
municipality. For example, during the first exercise,
when operators and leadership met to discuss threats
in their IT and business environments, they discovered
significant and previously unknown linkages within
their IT and OT systems.
The JV exercises illustrated the increasing
interconnectedness and vulnerabilities of critical
infrastructure sectors by bringing many key players to
the same table and facilitating discussions about the
threats to their IT and business environments.
Based on the exercises, the ACI recommends that
cities revisit their network monitoring of all OT/SCADA
systems to ensure only secure communications are
allowed between production networks and the open
Internet. Whenever possible, cities should mandate
and enforce the use of data diodes or one-way
network connections to monitor critical systems in
real time and prevent the corruption of missioncritical data external to the sector. As more physical
systems are operated, adjusted, regulated, monitored,
or otherwise remotely accessed by computer systems,
it is increasingly important to recognize that although
this advancement may increase convenience and
reduce costs, it also presents a growing potential
attack surface for malicious actors.
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Additional Lessons Learned:
• Cyber fusion cells are needed to improve publicprivate sector communication across a city or
county (i.e., the local level, or the lowest level
where coordination begins). This will enable cities
to develop proactive defenses. Many states are
currently developing cybersecurity strategies
that include establishing ISAOs (see section 4 for
additional information).7 While there are existing
means for enabling cyber preparation, prevention,
and responses, cities must be able to communicate
within the city as well as to state and federal
authorities. As cities develop their cybersecurity
plans, they should identify the organizations that
are essential for the functioning of the city/county
and consider developing PPPs aligned to their
critical systems.
• Cyber policies must be developed at the city/
county level in order to inform and shape state and
federal policies. In particular, policies related to
dealing with cyberspace attacks (e.g., ransomware)
are needed imminently. Moreover, as these
municipalities establish their policies, they should
share them with other cities/counties.
• City/county-level cyber exercises provide
opportunities for local levels of government to
experiment in a safe and trusted environment. In an
exercise setting, government actors can collaborate
with their private sector partners to work through
challenges, share best practices, and improve
processes and procedures. In particular, cyber
exercises provide ideal settings for the improvement
of cities’ and counties’ readiness for preventing or
responding to a cyberspace attack.
• Communication with public and private entities
must be done in a timely manner. By engaging
in exercises that simulate cyber incidents,
municipalities can experiment alongside partners
to develop innovative ways to share information
outside of regulated and active investigations. Cities
should address local, state, and federal information
sharing challenges (e.g., computer forensics)
associated with actionable information (e.g., law
enforcement reporting). Exercises effectively enable
this type of exploration that helps inform the public
without compromising investigations.
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• Response processes that involve outside assistance
should identify industry partners and describe when
and how they should be involved. As processes and
procedures are developed, they should outline how
they will be used to communicate to local, state,
and federal information sharing centers.
• Municipalities require communication plans that
follow formalized processes and efficiently counter
the spread of misinformation during a cyberspace
attack or outage. Municipalities should work with
the private sector to quickly determine whether
outages are cyber-related. Over time, this will
reduce response time while more quickly informing
state and federal policymakers.
• Exploring the capabilities of Internet service
providers (ISPs) can help municipalities integrate
the capabilities into the municipality response
plans. For example, by working with ISPs, cities
can develop plans to address denial of service
attacks against 911 dispatch which could prevent
the receipt of legitimate calls and severely slow
emergency response times.
• Operational and communication plans must
be able to rapidly respond while avoiding the
disclosure of sensitive information. Response plans
should outline ways of shaping the social media
impact from a cyberspace attack that negatively
affects electricity, transportation, or other
infrastructure sectors.

2.7. Feedback
One of the primary goals of the JV exercise was to
present agencies with the potential ramifications of
a cyberspace attack and observe and judge the city’s
ability to respond.
The ACI conducted site surveys in conjunction with
organizations from each of the participating critical
infrastructure sectors. These surveys aimed to identify
the policies and resources in place that could be used
to respond to a combined physical and cyberspace
attack. The ACI used the survey results to explore gaps
in these policies and resources.

Francesca Spidalieri, “State of the States on Cybersecurity,” Pell Center for International Relations and
Public Policy, Salve Regina University, November 2015, available from
https://pellcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/State-of-the-States-Report.pdf.
7
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JV 2.0 requested feedback in the form of a site survey
that asked participants the following 10 questions:
1. This question is about gaining a better
understanding of a municipality’s ability to
respond to a multi‐sector cyberspace attack. What
does communication and information sharing
look like at your organization and how does it
communicate across?
2. This question is about gaining a better
understanding of who should be a municipality’s
core team. During the initial response period
(24‐72 hours) of a cyberspace attack, what do you
believe should be the public‐private core team,
and what is their role?
3. In your expert opinion, how SHOULD public‐private
sector agencies at the municipality level work
through a cyber and physical attack?
4. In your expert opinion, what constitutes a cyber
event in a municipality?
5. This question is about gaining a better
understanding of learning or helping to identify the
triggers that will cause the municipality to react
during a cyber and physical event. In your expert
opinion, what are the thresholds and escalation
procedures during a cyberspace attack?
6. In your expert opinion, how does your organization
know if an event is cyber-related? How do you
validate indications of compromise?
7. In your expert opinion, what is your organization’s
messaging strategy to communicate to the public
during an event?
8. How does a municipality leverage an ISP?
9. In the event that a cyberspace attack escalated to
involve state‐level assets (i.e., the National Guard),
what do you believe would be the National Guard’s
response?
10. What are the capabilities needed?
We believe that the JV exercise series was the first
of its kind to allow participants to drive the scenario
on which they would be evaluated. This process
enabled key stakeholders to focus on identifying
weaknesses and crafting solutions for them. While
these participants focused on their own priorities, the
insights and data created during the exercise could
be leveraged to better understand how the Army
and DoD might be asked to support a “Cyber Worst
Day” scenario. Over time, this research could even
add to the growing literature about cyber exercises,
their effectiveness, and their role in contributing to
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organizational and community learning. This process
is critical to the theme of continuous learning and
conducting after-action reviews that makes the Army
and the DoD excel. The results of the JV 2.0 exercise
can be used to request resources from state and federal
agencies to help municipalities increase their resilience.

2.8. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis
The ACI and its partners developed a series of
questions to gain an understanding of the actual
consequences of a cyberspace attack. To collect and
analyze data, JV used an application called Tracker
that enabled observation of the Red and Blue LFX
teams as the exercises unfolded. A chat portal allowed
participants to communicate and record observations
for future analysis.

2.9. The Future of JV
As interconnectedness continues to increase the
potential attack surface for critical infrastructure,
cities must increasingly incorporate risk mitigation
considerations for cyber into their existing emergency
response frameworks. As they currently exist, most
are inadequate to adapt to the increasingly complex
threat facing urban communities.
As municipalities become increasingly “smart cities”
and Internet of things (IoT) devices increasingly
control operational and physical systems, cyberspace
presents new operational and safety risks for cities.
Cities need to develop a bottom-up, integrated,
risk management framework that is repeatable and
adaptable to the rapidly evolving threats to urban
communities. All levels of government need to think
about how to address these risks within state and
federal response plans.
Much like the Information Technology Infrastructure
Library (ITIL), the JV framework serves as a playbook
of modules that any municipality can use to exercise
elements of its critical infrastructure. By focusing
on its weaknesses and capabilities, enumerating
dependencies and infrastructure partnerships,
and better understanding the threat and response
environments, cities can improve their preparedness.
For example, a city with port operations, a public
transportation system, a complex medical system, and
a major tourism industry will look different from many
other cities, but its vulnerabilities and dependencies
among the sectors will have many similarities with
other cities’ vulnerabilities and dependencies.
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In that sense, each city has its own constellation of
infrastructure and related risks, but protecting such
systems from cyberspace attack and responding to
cyber incidents in them will have commonalities
across significantly different cities.
The insights gained from activities like JV exercises can
be leveraged to benefit other cities with similarities
and used to help differentiate response options.
The interdependencies among sectors introduce
complexities that most other exercises do not explore
or cannot simulate well. The JV research project
attempted to analyze potential attack surfaces
through an academic lens, thus increasing all U.S.
cities’ resilience. To be successful, the JV exercises
need to change behaviors and the mindsets of the
involved stakeholders in regard to cyberspace attacks.

3. OPERATIONAL FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following paragraphs discuss key operational
insights identified by researchers as a result of the JV
project exercises.

3.1. Operational Risk Management
Growing physical and cyber risk to cities requires a
different framework for risk mitigation due to a lack
of consensus on the form that cities’ frameworks
should take, and because some currently utilized
frameworks are inadequate to meet the changing and
growing threat to urban communities. Most existing
frameworks and approaches are designed for either
asset-level or organization-level risk management.
However, jurisdictions cross sectors, industries,
disciplines, and organizations. For the Nation to
defend itself, U.S. cities that are rendered vulnerable
to an attack need an adaptable and scalable model
to evolve the cybersecurity culture. A bottom-up
approach is required to integrate an operational risk
management system that is replicable and adaptive to
the rapidly evolving threat to urban communities.
Cyberspace attacks can quickly overwhelm
unprepared governments, in light of their limited
resources. According to a 2016 cybersecurity survey,
only 33 percent of local governments had a formal,
written, cyber incident response plan (IRP).8 Over the
last few years, ransomware attacks have repeatedly
8
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targeted city and county governments and hindered
their ability to perform services for the public. In
addition to demonstrating a need for municipal
governments to improve their cybersecurity practices,
these attacks demonstrate a need for governments
to build more resilience into their continuity and
emergency response plans.
Prior to JV 2.0, the City of Houston consistently
demonstrated its ability to respond to a diverse set
of natural and man-made physical events. In 2017
alone, Houston successfully prepared and provided
integrated emergency management services for
the Super Bowl, Hurricane Harvey, and the World
Series. The city, however, had never prepared for or
faced a combined physical and cyberspace attack
simulation. Additionally, although federal officials
had exercised sophisticated, nation-state attacks
on the homeland through exercises such as Cyber
Storm, Cyber Flag, GRIDEX, and the FEMA National
Level Exercise program, JV 2.0 was the first time that
an exercise of this kind was driven from the local
level. This effort required a considerable amount of
relationship building, planning, and training prior to
the event. JV 2.0 was a manpower-intensive activity
designed to bring together and assess the readiness of
participants at one point in time.
Implement Ongoing Education and
Development Efforts
The JV approach can serve as a learning system and
development effort. A series of JV exercises should
be developed and educational workshops and
conferences should be held in key cities and localities
to identify vulnerabilities, develop solutions, propose
actions, and share best practices.
Develop Risk Incident Response Campaign Plans
Statewide incident response campaigns should be
developed, funded, and implemented to leverage the
JV 2.0 model.
FEMA, DHS, the DoD, and the Department of Energy
(DOE) should work together to develop a campaign
plan to integrate the JV risk incident response
model into the exercise framework at the national
level (i.e., collaboratively among DHS, the DoD, and
DOE). Military reserve component forces should be
incorporated as part of this effort.

ICMA, “Cybersecurity 2016 Survey – Summary Report of Survey Results,” April 2017, available from
https://icma.org/sites/default/files/309075_2016%20cybersecurity%20survey_summary%20report_final.pdf.
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At the state level, funding and implementation may
be aspirational for some states, but campaign plan
development is comparatively low-cost. Numerous
states offer examples, though they tend to be statecentric rather than focused on supporting local
government and the public. Two such campaign
plans are Michigan’s Cyber Disruption Plan and West
Virginia’s Cybersecurity Workforce Strategic Plan,
which specifically describe efforts to assist localities.9
Working with other state agency and community
leaders, state emergency response coordinators
should lead this effort and serve as the central
resource for cities and localities in requesting
assistance from state governments and the Federal
Government. States, which play a critical role in
supporting a city’s response to cyberspace attacks,
need to develop campaign plans for more scalable
incident responses and more rapid information
sharing. This includes disseminating information via
traditional and social media, as well as combating
false narratives.
Public affairs and public relations officials should
immediately reach out to other counterparts to ensure
messaging is synchronized across the board and that all
members, parties, and organizations are tracking who
is the lead and who is the release authority.
A public affairs strategy must be in place prior to
a cyberspace attack with cascading effects that
impact multiple sectors. This includes defining
what information should be shared among various
organizations responsible for crisis management
and how public affairs officials and public relations
agencies should coordinate to inform the public
of events as they unfold. What information is
appropriate to release to the public, when it should be
released, and by whom it should be released are also
important questions to address.
It is critical to have a shared understanding of the
correct messages and products and who the release
authority is for a real-world crisis to ensure that
the responses are succinct and accurate, and that
organizations are unified in releasing information to
the public. There must be a clear understanding of
who the lead is and how the other members, parties,
and organizations can help support the lead. Public
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affairs and public relations officials need to create a
shared list of important crisis points of contact (POCs).
If synchronization does not occur prior to an incident,
there will be information fratricide, and public
perception and trust will deteriorate.
To achieve this synchronization, public affairs and
public relations officials and counterparts should
have at least one monthly synchronization meeting
to discuss possible crisis scenarios to which all parties
would need to respond until everything is agreed on
by all parties.
Afterwards, quarterly or biannual meetings should
suffice in which messaging, products, and sharing of
information should be developed.
States should develop templates of press releases,
products, and broad messaging (see appendix C)
that can be tailored later to specific events. These
templates should be collaboratively created, agreed
upon, and shared by all parties. Spokespersons for
each party involved should be nominated and chosen
prior to events so that everyone knows who will be
the spokespersons for specific crises.
Public affairs and public relations officials should
agree on a tentative timeline for appropriate releases
and have a plan in place regarding the different
communication media through which information will
be released during a crisis communication scenario.
For example, if all electricity is turned off, does
the communications team have enough batteries
and sufficient signal to release information? What
happens if cell towers go down? What is the backup
to the backup? How will information be shared if
everything goes analog for a while?
Develop Scaling Technology
Identified agencies should help develop technology
offerings that enable the scaling of the JV 2.0 LFX
component in support of NDAA, Section 1649, “Pilot
Program on Modeling and Simulation in Support of
Military Homeland Defense Operations in Connection
with Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure” (see
appendix D).10 They should not do this in isolation,
but with meaningful input from localities. One of
the reasons that the JV exercises succeeded, and
that some similar efforts did not, is that they were

National Governors Association, “Meet the Threat: States Confront the Cyber Challenge – Memo on 		
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developed in concert with the end users, rather than
being tested on them. As mentioned earlier, the NDAA
includes a provision for the development of a pilot
program based on the lessons learned from the
JV exercises.
The survey results for the LFX portion of the exercise
were overwhelmingly supportive. Those who had
contact with the cyber range wanted more time with
the platform. However, the cost per license for access
to cyber ranges was a cost-prohibitive factor for the
research project as funded.
During a response to a cyber-related incident, there
will be an increased need for forensic analysts to
conduct the post-analysis. Degrees of sophistication
vary; most organizations have some ability to ingest
cyber intelligence information and some capacity
to respond to or address cyber events that occur
on their networks. However, these efforts generally
lack the capability to analyze such events for the
express purpose of generating actionable indicators
of compromise (IOCs) that can then be shared with
the larger community. Ideally this process would
occur while a cyberspace attack was ongoing, but, at
the least, it should occur after an incident has been
resolved. Moreover, an organization would need to
have in place sufficient skill sets, policies, procedures,
and legal agreements to engage as an active and
reliable participant in the generation of actionable
intelligence that is useful to the larger community,
rather than merely ingesting intelligence information
from a regional sharing authority, such as a
fusion center.
Seek Research and Development Support
Part of the challenge is identifying and applying for
state and federal funds. States, cities, and localities
should seek R&D support from the Executive Branch
and Congress to develop appropriate systemic
approaches to cybersecurity. There was a real, albeit
stilled, influx of resources – both grant funding
and technical expertise and support – to build
counter-terrorism; intelligence; chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and explosives; and other
capabilities at the state and local level following 9/11.
There has been nothing similar as we have entered
the era of cyber crises. There is a systematic challenge
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regarding bottom-up requirements and top-level
funding. Cities may have the solutions, but they lack
the federal funding for operations, remediation,
and R&D.
Programs such as the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation
Unit, the Army Futures Command, and FEMA’s Hazard
Mitigation Grant program should be leveraged to help
build the necessary support.
Evolve Public-Private Partnership Integration and
Information Sharing
The private sector, which is affected by sophisticated,
adversarial cyber threats, has the incentive and
the capability to cooperate with the public sector
to inform, develop, and provide solutions. City and
local cybersecurity efforts should better integrate the
private sector, particularly its critical infrastructure
(e.g., electric grid, telecommunications, water, and
transportation). PPPs should evolve (i.e., move
beyond service-level agreements) to induce a cultural
change for building trusted relationships, sharing
information, and working together. In addition to
partnerships with private sector companies, the role
of non-profits in cybersecurity is extremely important.
From ISACs to ISAOs to federally-funded R&D centers
to universities, cities and states have a large number
of potential partners that want to contribute to the
increasing security and safety of the digital world
and the physical one that increasingly relies on it. For
example, Texas, through the University of Texas at
San Antonio (UTSA), is developing a cross-community,
cross-sector ISAO for the state. The military should
explore ways to assist states by growing their ISAOs
and thereby supporting cross-sector information
sharing and campaign planning and execution in
accordance with Executive Order 13691.11
Considerations should also include the leveraging of
best practices and lessons learned from the financial
sector’s Financial Systemic Analysis & Resilience
Center (FSARC) to implement a similar model at
local and state levels and, over time, the integration
of municipalities into the intelligence community’s
processes. Additionally, the role of non-profits in
cybersecurity is extremely important.

Executive Order 13691, “Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing,” Washington, DC: 		
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Lastly, key private sector representatives across all
infrastructures should meet at least monthly in a
single group to receive the same information and to
understand the appropriate context. Additionally,
private sector “certified active defenders” should
be identified who have significant cybersecurity
capabilities and can work under government
authorization to help prepare for and respond to
adversarial cyber threats.
Focus on Resilience Improvements
JV 2.0 provided additional lessons learned for further
education and applied research. It highlighted the
complexity of planning and executing a major urban
incident response research project and pointed to
the need for rapidly improving the cyber resilience
of cities on which the Army and DoD depend when
executing military missions, such as force projection.
Resilience improvements must include more extensive
public awareness, education, and applied research
efforts. This type of activity would require the
sustained engagement of senior Army and DoD
cyber leadership.

3.2. U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerability
The U.S. military and its allies depend on civil and
commercial infrastructure in and around cities. U.S.
infrastructure requires greater protection due to its
vulnerability to sophisticated physical and cyberspace
attacks.
While military installations have internal critical
infrastructure providers, they rely on service delivery
from outside the installations’ boundaries. For
example, electrical service is delivered through
commercial providers to the installation, where it
is distributed by the internal utility company. In the
event that a commercial provider was not able to
supply electricity, an installation could run on backup
power only for a finite period, and would generally do
so at a diminished capacity.12
An integral participant in JV 2.0 was the SDDC
battalion at Beaumont, Texas, a city on the state’s
coastal plain. Because of the large volume of cargo
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shipped from ports located along the U.S. Gulf Coast,
these ports serve as major DoD transportation nodes
for the overseas deployment of Army cargo. Two of
these nodes are strategic ports located in Texas—the
Port of Beaumont and the Port of Corpus Christi.
Almost 40 percent of Army cargo deployed in support
of Operation Iraqi Freedom flowed through these two
ports. The Port of Beaumont is home to one of SDDC’s
port-handling battalions.13
Like the City of Houston, the Military Port of
Beaumont is well prepared for natural hazards and
physical threat events. However, JV 2.0 highlighted
the challenges the port faces in preparing for and
responding to a physical or cyberspace attack. The
project identified gaps in service-level agreements,
understanding of cyber threats, and overall cyber
response procedures.
This requires cross-talk with owners of critical
infrastructure in accordance with the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan and the Critical
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council to discuss
priorities of effort within resilience response.14
In the absence of guidance, the energy grid will
default to restoring the most populous areas, which
are not likely to be military installations. Installation
commanders should ensure that utility companies
recognize the importance of service being restored as
quickly as possible based on mission requirements.
The Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
process has been well established, while Defense
Support to Cyber Incident Response (DSCIR) within
the DSCA framework is still being developed.
Authorities and the consent-based nature of
assistance are very different between DSCA and
DSCIR. There is a significant difference between
responding to a request from local civil authorities for
disaster response and responding to a lead federal
agency (LFA) that is responding to a request for
assistance from a private entity. In the cyber incident
response, the LFA responds within the limits of its
agreement with the private entity.
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Improve Transportation and Maritime Security
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and related Combatant Commands
should develop an operational risk management
framework that better enables the protection of
critical force projection elements inside and outside of
military boundaries for defense surface deployment
and distribution. Collaboration and planning must
include the Military Reserve, the National Guard, DHS,
and DOE.
U.S. Transportation Command is already held to
certain DoD cybersecurity requirements. Per DoD
Instruction Memo 8510.01, “Risk Management
Framework,” the DoD adheres to the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
framework.15 However, some commercial partners
may not be held to these same standards
and, as such, the risks associated with these
vulnerabilities can be further exacerbated during
coordinated response efforts.16 DoD contractors
and subcontractors are also subject to additional
cybersecurity measures. The Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement requires NIST SP
800-171 compliance for all of these entities in order to
ensure better protections for Controlled Unclassified
Information residing in nonfederal systems.17
The application of these same standards and other
available NIST risk management tools could act
as a starting point at the state and local levels of
governance to more robustly protect both federal and
nonfederal deployment and distribution operations
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during cyber emergencies.18 The City of Houston
already maintains a repository of this information
within its own Cybersecurity Control Implementation
Interface (CCII), which provides access to various NIST
frameworks, policy and procedure “boilerplates,” and
other interactive utilities.19 The 2018 National Cyber
Strategy highlights the prioritization of transportation
and maritime cybersecurity; this includes a focus on
clarifying roles, identifying specific responsibilities,
enhancing mechanisms for international coordination,
and developing “next-generation cyber-resilient
maritime infrastructure.”20 The 2018 DoD Cyber
Strategy echoes this sentiment as well with the
specific objective of defending both DoD and non-DoD
critical infrastructure, systems, and networks against
malicious activity.21
Accordingly, national recognition and prioritization of
maritime transportation, deployment, and distribution
capabilities can further enable the allocation of
resources at state and local levels of governance
to better secure these functionalities during cyber
emergencies. To accomplish this, state and local
levels of governance can take the lead with federally
provided resources to implement these critical civilian
maritime and transportation requirements within
their areas of responsibility. Identified agencies should
further assess the cyber resilience and readiness of
global military transportation units, such as SDDC.
Work with NATO and Allies
Because other countries may possess authorities
at the tactical level and may be able to employ
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resources more quickly, the U.S. military should work
with allies to develop similar integrated protection
frameworks in transload forwarding areas abroad
and with front-line states using mutual aid, Status
of Forces Agreements, and Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreements. As a starting place, these
efforts should be developed within NATO through the
fostering of support networks. Additionally, identified
agencies should develop and conduct Theater Support
Cooperation Plan activities to help allied armies and
military forces develop similar integrated protection
frameworks in transload forwarding areas and with
front-line states.
There are a number of international frameworks and
agreements that may act as appropriate mechanisms
for integrated allied protection. The NATO Industry
Cyber Partnership (NICP) is such an allied framework
that remains focused on cooperation with the private
sector for network protection, implementation of risk
reduction standards, international and national data
protection, and additional partnerships with both
national academia and scientific institutes involved
in cyber defense capabilities or capacity building.22
NICPs build upon preexistent structures and
relationships among member nations – specifically,
Computer Emergency Response Teams, NATO industry
representatives, and relevant vectors within academia
– in order to ensure “efficient and adequate support”
during cyber emergencies or incidents.23 Accordingly,
this existing NATO framework creates an opportunity
for further synchronization and protection of forward
operating areas during domestic or even international
cyber emergencies. The NATO Cooperative Cyber
Defense Centre of Excellence conducts research
and training in cyber defense, to include Locked
Shields and Crossed Swords, improving readiness and
cooperation among NATO members.24
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The European Union (EU) also recently agreed to
create a common framework that may support
additional international cooperation and integration
efforts during cyber emergency response efforts.
The EU Agency for Network and Information
Security (ENISA) is the primary agency that has been
designated to support implementation of the EU’s
Cybersecurity Act, which focuses on certification
of “specific ICT [information and communications
technology] processes, products, and services.”25
Although currently considered to be preliminary, early
coordination efforts can help synchronize acquisitionspecific agreements to positively impact protection
efforts during various cyber incidents or emergencies.
Additionally, ENISA heavily focuses on PPPs through
the European PPP Resilience effort in order to address
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection; the
2013 European Cybersecurity Strategy and the
Network and Information Security Directive of 2016
further support these efforts, as would the proposed
EU Cybersecurity Act.26
Lastly, the Group of Seven (G7) also offers an
additional framework that can support an integrated
approach to protection efforts during cyber events.
The G7’s Principles and Actions on Cyber emphasizes
support for “decisive and robust measures” against
malicious cyber activities, promoting cooperation and
collaboration among businesses, research institutes,
and nations regarding both international and national
cybersecurity efforts.27 G7 member nations may be
able to initiate specific actions through their own
protection frameworks, which could support a more
unified operational support structure during domestic
cyber emergencies or incidents.
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3.3. Cyber Response Processes and Capabilities
Assessment
National Guard units are providing physical security
to support cities and developing cyber capability to
provide cyber protection. State military departments
are working to evolve cyber response processes,
including partnership strategies, and capabilities more
rapidly to help cities. As capabilities are developed,
they need to be inventoried and regularly assessed for
readiness and employment inside and outside of state
jurisdictions. Mission assignment and authorities are
given for a limited duration.
JV 2.0 included discussions and observer participation
with a variety of Reserve and National Guard units,
including the Army Reserve, the Michigan Department
of Military and Veterans Affairs, the Washington
State Military Department, and the Texas Military
Department. These interactions demonstrated
that state National Guards have significant physical
response capabilities with well documented and
practiced procedures. State National Guard units are
developing cybersecurity capabilities and capacity
at varying levels, but these capabilities are not yet
being employed in support of scenarios like JV 2.0.
Processes for more rapidly developing and deploying
state National Guard cyber capabilities need to be
developed and exercised as part of homeland defense
campaign plans.
Develop a Cyber Asset Inventory
Previous exercises tended to gloss over how personnel
are transitioned from one status to another and
whether DHS has much interest in those transitions.
The DoD should develop and maintain an inventory
of existing and emerging, critical, National Guard and
Reserve, cyber capabilities. This inventory could be
leveraged by state military departments, enabling
better coordination between the DoD and DHS. These
capabilities should be tracked as they are developed.
States need to develop and publicize their concepts
of operation, including training and equipping,
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apart from Title 10 efforts to train and equip Cyber
Protection Teams. Many reservists and Guardsmen
serve in a spectrum of civilian jobs, but it is critical
that they understand their roles when mobilized in
their military capacity, whether Title 10, Title 32, or
State Active Duty (SAD). The Posse Comitatus Act
(PCA) does not apply to Title 32 or SAD.28 Worthy of
additional consideration are the provisions of both the
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
and the Economy Act, which must be addressed
up front.29, 30
With the exception of training exercises, DSCA; DSCIR;
National Guard Civil Support; Domestic Operations;
and FEMA’s National Disaster Recovery Framework,
codified in 2011, would be mobilized for a specific
event. In designing future JVs, the disconnect between
response to cyber incidents in a SAD capacity, most
likely as part of a Defensive Cyberspace Operations
Element (DCOE), and the response of National Guard
personnel integrated into a Title 10 response in
support of an LFA should be examined.
The Major General Tim Lowenberg National Guard
Cyber Defenders Act has been proposed to create
“National Guard Cyber Civil Support Teams” that serve
at the discretion of state governors. If passed, this
legislation may provide a mechanism and funding for
assisting local authorities in establishing these teams
to bridge federal and nonfederal response efforts
during cyber emergencies or disasters.31 This could
address those factors in a particular scenario that
would drive a decision to use SAD personnel versus
integrating with the DoD response. These units can
act as an important link to private sector entities, as
many of these individuals gain critical skills, training,
and experience from their regular civilian employment
capacity that can be leveraged during federal, state,
or local cyber emergencies.32 Efforts also continue to
effectively align National Guard cyber capabilities with
all 10 FEMA regions by fiscal year 2022 in order to
ensure adequate emergency coverage; this coverage
is projected to include 10 directly-aligned Cyber
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Protection Teams, one per region.33 These teams will
be in addition to five Cyber Support Companies and
five Cyber Warfare Companies, all operating under
state authorities.34
Cities and municipalities should analyze the potential
costs, appropriateness, readiness, risk, lethality, and
legality35 of potential responses to a cyberspace attack
to better understand in what ways the National Guard
and Reserves might be needed to assist. In particular,
they should consider:
• Who will be paying or reimbursing the Guard or
Reserves?
• When is a request for military forces considered an
appropriate response?
• Does the request for support impact the National
Guard’s and Reserves’ performance of the primary
mission?
• How can the safety of forces be assured?
• What is the public relations risk of acting or not
acting?
• What should the rules of engagement for military
forces be?
• Does the need to restore cyber capabilities save
lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great
property damage?

3.4. The Role of States in Cyber Incident Response
States play a critical role in supporting city responses
to physical and cyber events. States must develop
campaign plans for more scalable incident responses
and rapid information sharing. Several states are
in the process of establishing fusion centers and
ISAOs. As an example, the State of Connecticut
issued the Connecticut Cybersecurity Strategy in
2017 and the Cybersecurity Action Plan in 2018.
The plan includes sections for state government,
municipal governments, business, higher education,
and law enforcement to address the following goals:
cyber literacy, preparation, response, recovery,
communications, and verification.36
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Texas represents another example. With the support
of the Texas Governor’s Office, JV 2.0 participation
included the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS),
the Directorate of Information Resources (DIR), and
the Texas Military Department. DIR and DPS were
active participants throughout all phases of JV 2.0.
Importantly, state universities, such as the University
of Houston, UTSA, and Texas A&M University have a
special relationship with the state and played a critical
role in furthering education and application in JV 2.0.
Lessons learned at the state level included the need
for cyber resources to be more integrated into state
emergency response activities.
States must provide leadership and direction as well
as coordinate the necessary funding to enable cities
to better protect at-risk infrastructure and services.
Municipalities must incorporate infrastructure sectors
into their emergency response plans to help mitigate
and respond to the threats they face in both the
physical and digital domains. Information sharing
programs are necessary but not sufficient. States need
to develop and sustain integrated incident response
exercise and training programs which include
government, industry, and academic partners.
This is important to view in the context of many states
struggling to secure their own networks or to resource
and staff their cybersecurity organizations. The
provision of additional support by states to localities,
particularly of the operational and tactical variety, is
probably aspirational in the immediate term. Some
states are experimenting with models that provide
such support, but, in many cases, they are either
functionally narrow (like providing a vulnerability
scanning or penetration testing capability) or in their
organizational infancy.
Adoption by States and Municipalities
Given the array of current threats to major cities,
a primary goal of JV was to build a framework
that could be replicated in any city. In the future,
determined or unscrupulous attackers will likely
continue to target and overwhelm local and state
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governments unless they adopt better cybersecurity
practices and response procedures. Even then, the
prognosis is complicated. Cities and states often have
far smaller IT budgets and staffs than their federal
partners or private sector companies do, and these
better-resourced and better-staffed organizations
continue to experience cybersecurity problems.
A coordinated attack could overwhelm available
federal and state cyber resources. This potential for
disaster requires cities to maintain internal cyber
capabilities; remain proactive in cybersecurity;
incorporate cyber incident response measures into
their disaster recovery and response procedures;
and, in some cases, maintain the capacity to continue
certain mission-critical functions without computer
assistance or support.
Due to population density and the density of
infrastructure and the man-made environment, cities
are particularly susceptible to cyber threats that can
quickly spread from one network to the next and
one sector to the next and become kinetic – that is,
they can spread from information processing systems
through cyber-physical systems to cause real-world
service interruptions and even risk safety and lives.
A power disruption can impact traffic on subways,
stranding thousands of people for prolonged periods
of time. Compromised technological systems can
have devastating effects on the healthcare sector,
as modern medical centers have a tremendous
and growing reliance on technology to control and
program medical devices like pacemakers, which are
implanted in people’s bodies.
A rapid proliferation of cyberspace attacks can quickly
overwhelm unprepared governments. In February and
March 2018, ransomware attacks had serious impacts
on online services in Atlanta, Georgia; 911 dispatch
services in Baltimore, Maryland; and government
networks in Davidson County, North Carolina.37
Recovering from the attacks could cost Atlanta
and its taxpayers as much as $17 million.38 These
attacks serve as real-world examples of the types of
serious threats that U.S. cities face and the need for
states and municipalities to act now to develop and
implement effective cybersecurity strategies.
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The State of Connecticut has approached
cybersecurity in a manner consistent with the ACI’s
recommendations and could serve as a model for
other states or even large cities. In July 2017, the
state issued the Connecticut Cybersecurity Strategy
and followed it up in May 2018 with a Cybersecurity
Action Plan. This plan includes sections for state
governments, municipal governments, businesses,
institutions of higher education, and law enforcement
to address the following goals: cyber literacy,
preparation, response, recovery, communications,
and verification. Additionally, the plan identifies
priorities and action steps while addressing legislative,
regulatory, and budgetary considerations.39 Since
the Greater Houston area is roughly the size of
Connecticut and twice as populous, it would not be a
stretch for the local government to also develop and
implement a strategic vision.
A model such as Connecticut’s is a great step in the
right direction. Its success, however, will still largely
rely on proactive municipal governments developing,
implementing, and testing their own plans as well as
legislators providing input with a long-term outlook
on security.
The organization and structure of Los Angeles’s Cyber
Intrusion Command Center and LA Cyber Lab, as well
as the New York City Cyber Command, can serve
as models for large cities that are trying to balance
their business and security concerns while improving
preparedness and coordinating responses.
Develop a Common Communication Protocol
As recently experienced, regularly occurring events,
such as elections, can be manipulated. Robust
interagency involvement staffed with the appropriate
authorities can support the monitoring of the actions
of threat actors in urban environments. Municipalities
within jurisdictions must develop a way to come
together in the wake of a major emergency, whether
it is a major healthcare catastrophe like a pandemic or
a cyberspace attack that targets major infrastructure
and endangers the public. At the municipality and
county level, there is a need to establish a common
protocol. A jurisdiction should be judged on its
ability to operate under a common set of principles
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that all component departments and agencies are
aware of in any given emergency. A critical event
will raise a variety of implications for the various
sectors involved; as the adage goes, where you stand
depends on where you sit. Cities, counties, and states
coordinate and interact differently across the country.
While there is no one-size-fits-all model of this kind
of coordination, the move in a general direction to
improve interoperability and information sharing is
an important one. There are ongoing efforts today
that exist at the federal level to evolve these efforts.
The two examples known are practiced within the
financial and energy sectors.
In 2016, eight U.S. banks from the Financial Services
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC),
an organization created in 1999 by the financial
services sector to address emerging physical and
cybersecurity threats, began working together to
study ways in which the critical infrastructure of
the Nation’s financial system could be made more
robust and its systemic risks reduced. This effort led
to the establishment of the FSARC, a partnership
of participating banks; industry members; and U.S.
Government agencies, such as the Department of
the Treasury (TREAS), DHS, and the FBI. The FSARC
identifies, assesses, and oversees efforts to mitigate
systemic risks to the Nation’s financial system
presented by the threat of cyberspace attacks.
With the initiatives of the FS-ISAC, the financial
services sector became the first CIKR sector to
begin evolving the way that a sector-specific agency
exchanges information. This best practice within the
financial sector is exploring cross-communication
among other priority sectors – power, utility, and
telecommunications – which is driving a new model
of information sharing to the next generation. This
model of public-private collaboration provides a
level of realization that there are dependencies, and
understanding how information exchanges is critical.
Project Indigo, a pilot program recently developed by
FS-ISAC and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM),
represents a good example of an information sharing
channel designed to provide data to USCYBERCOM,
DHS, and TREAS about nation-state hacking aimed at
the financial sector.40
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Within the emergency services sector, law
enforcement typically has the earliest situational
awareness during a critical event. It is common for
law enforcement to not immediately disclose this
information so as to not damage the investigation of
what could become a criminal case. This approach can
adversely affect sectors like healthcare that have a
different set of concerns, such as patient care. Critical
questions include the following:
• At what point can IOCs be shared between law
enforcement and the technical staff and chief
information officer (CIO) of each sector?
• How can this information sharing be maximized for
the safety of healthcare patients or other sectors’
stakeholders and the public at large without the
potential of damage to an ongoing or future
criminal case?
These are difficult questions to answer, but balancing
the factors they present is critical, and a jurisdiction
will be judged by the court of public opinion no
matter how the decisions are made.

3.5. Policy and Legal Authorities
Policy and legal authorities at the federal and state
levels currently do not sufficiently empower cities to
respond to cyber incidents. Policies and authorities
need to be reviewed and adjusted to better help
cities defend against sophisticated physical and cyber
threats. Currently, the exploration of cyber mutual
assistance is practiced only within the energy sector.
A key element of JV 2.0 was a military policy and legal
workshop held prior to the TTX. The TTX allowed
stakeholders to create a baseline where, before issues
arose in exercise execution, experienced personnel
across the various sectors identified key issues and
inadequacies in the current DSCA for cyber incident
response and in the policies and procedures for
providing cyber mutual assistance through National
Guard and industry sectors across state lines. The
workshop also noted the lack of an operational
net assessment process at the national level for
continuously assessing comprehensive physical and
cyber risks to cities and military installations.

Chris Bing, “Inside ‘Project Indigo,’ the Quiet Info-Sharing Program between Banks and U.S. Cyber Command,”
CyberScoop, May 21, 2018, available from
https://www.cyberscoop.com/project-indigo-fs-isac-cyber-command-information-sharing-dhs/.
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Develop Cyber Response Procedures
Identified agencies should work with the National
Guard and others to develop cyber response
procedural handbooks to be shared across state
military departments. The National Guard should be
trained on cyber response policies and procedures,
and the effectiveness of exercise programs used by
U.S. Northern Command, USCYBERCOM, and FEMA
should be assessed.
NIST offers an incident response framework – the NIST
Computer Security Incident Handling Guide – that
provides assistance in the creation of an effective
and efficient incident response methodology.41 The
framework has been applied at the federal level, and
could potentially be adopted at both the state and
local levels as well, provided it can be appropriately
scaled to state and local governance architectures.
As previously mentioned, the City of Houston already
maintains a repository of this information within its
own CCII.42
Another resource worthy of attention is the DHS
Critical Infrastructure Cyber Community Voluntary
Program, which provides technical assistance in the
application of the NIST framework for state, local,
tribal, and territorial governments.43 The coupling of
information that is readily available via Houston’s CCII,
along with DHS technical implementation support via
the United States Computer Emergency Readiness
Team, could better enable the application of a more
scalable cyber response framework at local levels of
governance.
In addition to federal support mechanisms, other
model municipal and regional architectures could also
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potentially be applied to cyber response procedures,
such as San Diego’s Region-Wide Incident Response
Guide. This guide provides a framework that both
incorporates and synchronizes private and public
sector cyber emergency response efforts.44
The State of California also has a cyber incident
response guide that can provide context for the
formulation of a regional or municipal model. Created
by the California Office of Emergency Services, this
plan provides guidance for the creation of specific IRPs
that are directly nested in the state’s Cybersecurity
Integration Center and that focus on reducing the
severity of cyber incidents.45 Therefore, other existing
federal, state, and regional cyber incident response
guides can also provide a mechanism for the creation
of such a guide at the city level.
Lastly, the Army Reserve’s Immediate Response
Authority (IRA)46, which has never been exercised for
cyber, should be considered.
Develop Cyber Mutual Assistance Policy and
Implementation Guidance with Ongoing Intelligence
Assessment
Military organizations such as the National Guard
Bureau should explore possibilities in cyber mutual
assistance practice. This would involve developing
policy and associated implementation guidance
to enable more proactive and sustained, national
military support to cities and localities defending
against physical and cyberspace attacks.
Local communities and state and national security
leaders should develop and annually update national
intelligence assessments of the physical and cyber
capabilities of designated nation-state and terrorist
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adversaries to exploit predictable natural and
threat-based, man-made events. The newly-created
DHS National Risk Management Center and the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
should also be engaged.
Identified military organizations should assist OSD and
interagency partners, such as the new DHS National
Risk Management Center, in the development of a
continuous net assessment process for the Federal
Government that can help municipal and military
installation leaders achieve a better understanding
of physical and cyberspace threats and risks to their
enterprises. The DHS National Risk Management
Center was created to improve the ability of the
private sector and the Federal Government to work
together to combat adversaries, citing nation-state
threats to private industry.47
Review and Improve DSCA Procedures
Associated organizations should continue to review
DSCA procedures in light of JV 2.0 findings and
develop recommendations for providing Army and
military commander IRA in cyberspace.
Create a Legal Framework
Because cyber effects can influence the ability of state
and local authorities to react, legal frameworks should
be developed that address responses to cyberspace
attacks that occur simultaneously with a physical
attack. DSCA is the process by which DoD personnel
and assets are used to assist in missions typically
undertaken by civil authorities, such as responses to
natural and man-made disasters, law enforcement
support, special event support, and other domestic
activities. DSCA is well established as an all-of-nation/
whole community approach, integrating efforts
across federal, state, local, private sector, community,
nongovernmental, and individual partners.

JACK VOLTAIC 31
While DSCA is well established, the more specific
DSCIR is still under development. At present, DTM
17-007, “Interim Policy and Guidance for Defense
Support to Cyber Incident Response,” provides
temporary guidance until DSCA (DoDD 3025.18; Joint
Publication 3-28) can be revised to include cyberspace
attacks.48, 49, 50
It will be important to publicize and socialize any
changes or emerging policies with states (which
directly interact with federal coordinating officers and
defense coordinating officers) and cities that typically
do so through state representatives because, similar
to traditional, non-cyber, DSCA operators, it is possible
that lack of understanding of the policy, process, or
requirements could result in unnecessary delay or
confusion.
Transition to Law Enforcement
It is important for all responders to know when a
response to a cyberspace attack transitions to law
enforcement and who is responsible for preserving
the forensic integrity of data and other evidence.
This legal framework is critical because, whether the
mission of an agency involves cyber operations, all
federal assets and organizations need to understand
the Request for Assistance and Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) processes
before they preemptively (and unlawfully) insert
themselves into incident response. In accordance
with the National Incident Response Framework
(Presidential Policy Directive 41), the DoD must
understand that, regardless of its rank or seniority,
it is not the lead during a cyberspace attack.51
Rather, the role of the DoD is to support the local
authorities, whether on-site or in a remote capacity.
EMAC forces remain under the administrative control
of respective states and operate at the direction
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of the state’s governor, adjutant general, or other
designee. This requires a memorandum of agreement
to memorialize the duties and responsibilities of
the various organizations to ensure that C2 remains
clear. Additionally, should the DoD act preemptively
without the proper authorization, the DoD would
face the financial risk under these circumstances
that an organization will not pay for services that it
did not request, need, or want, potentially running
afoul of the Antideficiency Act by incurring financial
obligations before they are authorized.52
Potential Legal Repercussions
Cybersecurity first responders should not be put in
jeopardy of legal repercussions because of a request
for their support at the scene of a cyberspace attack.
In the DHS and FEMA context, DSCA is executed
through pre-scripted mission assignments that are
generally well understood. We are in the beginning
stages of the cyber incident response context.
There is much work to do within the DoD and
the National Guard to understand and shape the
differences among responses of the National Guard
under SAD, Title 32, and Title 10 authority. Previous
exercises tended to gloss over how personnel are
transitioned from one status to another and the
degree to which DHS has interest in those transitions,
which raises the question: What drives the decision
to use SAD personnel versus integrating with the DoD
response? Consider the differences in a potential
response to cyber incidents in SAD capacity, most
likely as part of a DCOE, and the response of National
Guard personnel integrated into a Title 10 response
in support of an LFA. The authorities, capabilities,
and needs may not always exist at the same place
and time or within the same organization; thus,
thinking about the way that companies, jurisdictions,
and the DoD leverage each other’s capabilities is
key in responding effectively to incidents without
undermining democratic values, the public trust, or
the rule of law.
The PCA limits the powers of the Federal Government
to use federal military personnel to enforce domestic
policies within the United States.53 Neither active duty
personnel nor reservists are authorized to conduct
law enforcement, and must operate in accordance
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with the mission.54 However, during the mission, some
may encounter illegal or fraudulent activity, conduct
law enforcement activities with the best of intentions,
and ask for forgiveness later rather than permission
beforehand. This is better understood in the DHS and
FEMA context, but is still under development in the
area of cyber incident response.
Normally, initiative is a positive attribute, but FEMA
may not reimburse for preemptive work or work
performed outside the scope of mission assignment.
Those that operate outside of their mission command
not only face potential disciplinary action, but
also jeopardize relationships among the various
stakeholders. For example, the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act criminalizes knowingly accessing “a
protected computer” without authorization or beyond
authorization, and thus jeopardizes relationships
among the various stakeholders.55
This is an unexplored area because there have been
relatively few large-scale cyber incident responses by
states and cities – but episodes like those in Atlanta,
Baltimore, and elsewhere suggest that one major
set of questions moving forward will pertain to the
authorities, liabilities, and responsibilities of various
officials and levels of government in regard to data
privacy or data protection issues arising from cyber
incident response activities.
This raises a critical question: Why mobilize an active
duty or reserve unit if it is prohibited from doing
what is needed? If Service members get injured while
performing an unauthorized service, subsequent line
of duty determinations or workers’ compensation
claims become uncertain. In a traditional law
enforcement setting, the Rules for the Use of Force
by civil authority are established by federal law
developed through many years of civil litigation
involving the liability of the Federal Government for
the actions of federal employees, including military
personnel. States, as separate sovereigns, have their
own tort liability laws that largely coordinate with the
federal standards, but may have differences. Incidents
are resolved quickly. As bad actors are generally
visible, the rules on escalation of force are clear and
the liability is predictable.

Antideficiency Act of 1982, 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, op. cit.
54
Ibid.
55
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1984).
52
53

RESEARCH SUMMARY
Conversely, with “Rules for the Use of Cyber,” which
has not been formally codified, attribution issues
and effects are complicated and, therefore, serious
questions arise, such as the following:
• How certain is attribution?
• How does one escalate in cyber?
• Who is the appropriate authority for approving a
cyber response?
• What, if any, are the liability limitations?
• Should a response to a cyberspace attack be limited
to or even involve a cyber-based response?
• What are possible second and third-order effects of
a cyber-based response?

4. ACADEMIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
JV is a research project that provides both operational
and academic insights. While the operational element
focuses on developing better answers, the academic
element of JV focuses on how to ask better questions.
The academic insights below address conducting gap
analysis, coordination studies, scenario development,
cyber education, organizational interaction and
integration, and data collection. The following
paragraphs discuss key academic insights identified by
researchers through the JV project exercises to date.

4.1. Gaps in Cyber Incident Response
Although the JV project has helped make significant
strides in critical infrastructure and PPP research,
future research should focus on the remaining gaps,
such as coordination between jurisdictions, entities,
and governments. These gaps must be identified in
order to craft solutions and identify resources needed
to operationalize these policies. Since municipalities
are likely to initially lead the incident response for
most critical infrastructure, identifying these gaps will
help cities, states, and the Federal Government adjust
budgets and increase readiness.
Test Coordination Between Cities and States
Future iterations of the JV research program should
focus on exercising the coordination among cities,
states, and the Federal Government. Cities do not
have the same level of resources as states, and are
less likely to have sufficient organic personnel and
56
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authorities to effectively respond to a cyberspace
attack on their own. While states do not have as many
resources as the Federal Government, the state level
is the first level that can request military assistance in
responding to an event.
The most cost-effective outcome of the JV program
was the identification, in advance, of critical C2 nodes
and personnel who would respond to a cyber-physical
incident or attack. By rehearsing the scenario in
advance of a natural disaster or man-made event,
POCs can be identified in advance. This reduces the
time needed to develop an effective and unified
response plan during a crisis.
The National Cyber Strategy focuses on the Federal
Government, private industry, and international cyber
relations, while making no mention of the role of
states and local governments in critical infrastructure
protection, or even cybersecurity in general.56
In addition, if city-state coordination is needed, we
must identify the proper procedures for requesting
support for different categories of resources. Rather
than waiting for an emergency declaration, it may be
beneficial for cities and states to request assistance
at the first signs of a cyber incident. Physical incident
response procedures have been well vetted due to the
increased emphasis since 2001. Cybersecurity incident
response, which is still not well defined, requires
multiple exercise iterations at the state and local level
for the development and rehearsing of C2 during
these types of incidents.
Develop Coordination Studies
Further studies are needed regarding coordination
among industries and coordination between
industries and governments. Multiple-sector
cybersecurity exercises are still a rarity and fleshing
out the dependencies between adjacent sectors
is crucial. For example, it would be valuable to
see how a power failure would affect healthcare,
transportation, and first responders. Likewise,
identifying the sectors most dependent on grid power
could help companies and governments improve
their resilience. Similarly, identifying sectors critical to
the government’s ability to respond to man-made or
natural disasters could ultimately reduce the potential
impacts of a cyberspace attack.
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During the JV event, a participant noticed that
malicious traffic appeared to be directed at his
company from another participant’s servers. When
the attacked participant was asked how he or she
would respond, the participant stated that he or she
would probably call his or her buddy in the attacking
participant’s organization. Currently, there is a reliance
on personal relationships, which could be both a help
and a hindrance in the event of an attack. If there
are personal relationships between members of
organizations, information sharing is likely to happen
more quickly.
Formalized reporting and sharing procedures between
industries and government increase familiarity
between industry and government actors and could
speed up the identification of anomalous behavior,
hasten the notification process, and increase the
likelihood of a quicker reaction following an event.
While there are considerations about reputation
and the ability of an adversary to further exploit
a vulnerability if information about it is released
publicly, reporting cyber incidents within an industry
or industries can reduce the scope of an attack.
Increasing the transparency of incident response,
business continuity, and disaster recovery plans may
improve best practices within industries and assist
governments in identifying critical shortcomings
and challenges.
Study Coordinated Attacks on Multiple Cities
and States
Future iterations should explore the possibility of
a coordinated cyberspace attack spanning multiple
cities and states. While such an attack, as far as we
know, has not happened, there are no technical
barriers to an adversary launching a coordinated
attack. This scenario presents a difficult challenge for
policymakers due to the separation of geographic
jurisdictions.
During a widespread outage or incident response,
one must designate a lead agency. Depending on
the size and scope of the situation, this may be a
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federal, state, or local agency. If the attacker is a
nation-state, the response may become a Title 10 or
DoD action. Most cybersecurity incidents begin with
a local law enforcement response. However, defining
the thresholds for escalation to the state and federal
level and exploring in-depth all possible courses of
action are certainly academic research topics worthy
of examination. Exploring how to coordinate and
communicate across jurisdictions would improve
reaction speed and efficacy. Identifying how best to
allocate resources among competing emergencies
would improve resource prioritization practices
and help validate the feasibility of emergency
response plans.
Future Scenario Development
In developing future scenarios, ensure that physical
events in the scenario do not obscure the need
or ability to respond to cyber events. In the JV
2.0 scenario, which combined a hurricane with a
cyberspace attack, the hurricane minimized the
effects of the cyber events for some industries. While
this allowed those industries to keep their damage to
a minimum, it prevented them from fully testing their
IRPs in a meaningful way.
The preexistent bias of most operators and
practitioners is to assume that a system failure is
caused by the physical domain. A career-long basis
of training in the physical domain is difficult to
overcome with a few exercises and a training course.
However, we must continue to strive for a balanced
approach to incident response and failure resolution
in our industrial control systems (ICSs). During future
cybersecurity incidents, operational personnel’s biases
may be used against them to mask the true nature of
an attack and convince them that nothing is wrong.
Even worse, operational personnel may believe
there is something wrong when there is not, thereby
inducing a problem themselves. This precarious
position is where we find ourselves until we can be
sure that we have eliminated and protected ourselves
against any possible “ghost in the machine.”
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4.2. Incorporating, Testing, and Sharing
Cyber Education
To improve on the success of the JV project,
a cybersecurity education program should be
developed. This program should incorporate
cybersecurity lessons learned and be tested for
its impact on performance, shared with the wider
community, and integrated into the curricula of
military educational institutions and institutions of
higher learning. As participants may have varying
levels of experience, every effort should be made
to establish a baseline of knowledge to enable
meaningful participation.
Test the Ability to Identify a Cyberspace Attack
A future research project should test participants’
ability to identify a cyberspace attack. Based on
their experiences with previous incident response
exercises and training, the cyber maturity level of
the organization and participating personnel should
be assessed using the Community Cyber Security
Maturity Model.57 The five maturity levels are
Initial, Established, Self-Assessed, Integrated, and
Vanguard. Based on the initial level of participants,
organizational maturity should be increased to the
next level or higher by the end of the exercise. For
example, if the average participant from an electrical
utility is performing at the Initial level (level 1), then
the participant should be met where he or she is and
the level of the exercise should be crafted so as to
guide the organization to the Established or SelfAssessed maturity level (level 2-3). If the participant’s
entry level is 3, then the participant should be pushed
to advance his or her security practices to at least
the Integrated level (level 4).58 Through an iterative
process of refining both the participants’ plans and
the exercise itself, participants should ultimately strive
to reach the Vanguard level.
During JV, participants were supplied with the
information that they were being attacked so that the
exercise could be completed within the given time
constraints. However, many of the injects may have
taken far longer than a few minutes to identify, and
possibly even longer to address.
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Add an Educational Component
An educational component of the JV project should
be added to inform cities, localities, and states of the
value of critical infrastructure protection and their
roles in it. The cybersecurity of industry partners
should be assessed. In addition, the government
workforce should be educated in cybersecurity. We
can educate, train, and evangelize corporate America,
but if we leave government officials behind, they
will remain uneducated and uninspired to develop
proactive policies and solutions to problems before
they become local, regional, or national crises.
A series of workshops that focused on critical
infrastructure protection would not only inform
government leaders about the challenges they
may face, but also bring diverse private industry
representatives and state and local governments
together. Establishing partnerships in advance would
quicken the notification and cooperation process in
the event of an attack.
Integrate Knowledge into Institutional Curricula
Knowledge gained through JV research should be
institutionalized through curriculum integration at
military educational institutions, such as the U.S.
Military Academy and the U.S. Army War College,
and at institutions of higher learning, such as the
University of Houston and UTSA. Such institutions are
well positioned to integrate the operational findings
of JV directly into graduate and undergraduate
cybersecurity curriculum to educate the future
workforce in the critical infrastructure industry and
expose it to the current best practices. In this way, the
body of knowledge about cybersecurity integration
and critical infrastructure protection can be expanded
throughout government and private industry and fed
back into operator training. This two-way exchange
would allow academia to learn from private industry
(as it does now in fields such as healthcare and
aviation) and, in turn, produce the next generation of
leaders for that industry. The use of ISACs and ISAOs
should also be considered.
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4.3. Increase Interactions among IT Personnel,
Management, and Senior Leadership
To increase our understanding of incident
identification, communication, and response, as
well as strategic cyber decision-making, integration
must be strengthened between IT and OT personnel
and management, and senior leadership should be
included as participants in future research.
Involve Senior Leaders as Participants
Senior leaders should actively participate in
the exercise, making decisions as to how their
organizations will react to the scenario as well as
whether to share information with the public or other
organizations. While distinguished visitors were able
to observe middle management and operators at
work, which can give them some insights, it would
be beneficial to insert them into the situation so that
they can think through strategic actions that they
would need to take.
If leaders are not knowledgeable about cyberspace, a
baseline understanding would allow them to become
actively engaged, making them more able to render
decisions as they would need to in a real situation.
One of the most valuable outcomes for many
participants in JV was when the senior executive
team for each sector met in person the operators
who were representing their organizations in the
LFX. In many large organizations, there are multiple
layers of administration between policymakers and
the front-line, day-to-day executors of those policies.
Multiple observers during the LFX reported that the
most effective exchanges within a single organization
were between vertical levels of the team. This vertical
integration is critical during a crisis so that decisionmakers are aware of the current status minute by
minute, and so that they understand the operational
impact of their decisions.
Strengthen and Test TTX and LFX Integration
TTX and LFX integration should be strengthened and
further tested. The IT professionals of each agency
must be integrated into the emergency management
planning process and allowed to have operational
influence in the exercise. This influence should
extend from the exercise to real-life emergencies.
It is a common complaint of IT staffs that they are
brought into an incident too late, are not consulted
for their input, or have no real influence in an incident
where technology plays a key role. The decisions
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that are made in incidents that involve technology
will be severely compromised if the IT staff does not
play a key role. Because of our world’s tremendous
reliance on technology in almost all aspects of living,
particularly with the advent of the IoT, one can hardly
conjure up an incident fact pattern where technology
does not play a key role.
This integration must be done formally and under
the authority of the principal of the jurisdiction;
otherwise, it will be in name only. Any governing
or key body that dictates the protocol must include
the CIO and the chief information security officer
or their top designees. Another added benefit of
incorporating the IT staff is the coordination of the
cyber incident plans. Though departments within
jurisdictions may already have cyber incident plans in
place, the departments must ensure that their plans
are coordinated, that the procedures in their plans
will not thwart the goals of other departments’ plans,
and that their plans are not at cross purposes with
each another.
The ability to respond to a cyberspace attack is
also dictated by the resources that a jurisdiction
possesses. There should be a centralized process for
determining the needed technology procurements for
individual agencies so that there is proper continuity
of operations and compatibility of resources during
an event. IT staff can leverage ISACs to keep the
jurisdiction agencies well versed in the current
security threats targeting their specific potential,
be it personally identifiable information, money,
research, or another asset. This networking allows for
preparation for targeted attacks and an early warning
for the jurisdiction.

4.4. Consistent, Nonattributable Data Collection
Is Critical for Future Exercises
Data collection and metrics need further exploration.
As a result of the qualitative nature of the research,
observers and evaluators should collect the majority
of the data throughout the JV series, with a focus on
collecting consistent, nonattributable data to inform a
replicable framework for future critical infrastructure
research. Due to the collaborative nature of the JV
project, during the planning conferences, stakeholders
must develop specific, measurable, relevant,
attainable, and time-based goals for observation
during the exercise. Additionally, exploration of an
increased role for quantitative data collection may
provide further insights.
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Standardize Data Collection

Incorporate JV Findings into a Repeatable Framework

Data collection needs to be standardized and
consistent. Based on the detailed research goals
and metrics stakeholders generate during the
planning conferences, a data collection plan must be
developed that determines the research questions
being answered as well as the methodology for
measurement. During JV, several observers took
notes, but the notes varied in focus based on the
background of the participants. Key stakeholders must
develop specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and
time-based goals for observation purposes during
the exercise.

Findings from each iteration of JV should be
incorporated into a repeatable framework and used
to shape it. Each iteration of JV should build upon the
prior versions as well as add new elements to ensure
that it does not just become an exercise in testing the
current environment. The repeatable framework can
then be used by other cities and states to conduct
their own exercises, enabling JV to expand at a
greater rate.

Qualitative measurements are designed to test human
perception and reasoning. One such methodology
is a survey, which can measure the educational
background and experience of participants and
the rationale behind their actions. Qualitative
measurements are designed to gather information
from a large group of people quickly. Another type
of qualitative measurement is interviews, which take
longer, but are likely to provide deeper insights.
Quantitative measurements are designed to test
actions taken and the time it took to complete the
actions. Cyber range data can provide a wealth of
quantitative data, including time taken to discover an
anomaly, how the operator reacted to the anomaly,
time taken to remediate the anomaly, and how the
participant did so.
Balance Operational and Academic Data Collection
In designing data collection procedures, there should
be a balance between operational and academic
collection, which would require specific guidance
as to the attribution of information. This may take
place during the collection or sanitization of the
information prior to publishing reports. Surveys can
be anonymized from the outset by not requiring the
name of a participating individual or company to
prevent attribution. This also increases the likelihood
that the participant will provide honest answers,
since they cannot be traced back to the specific
individual. The information can still be useful on
an operational level if the participant’s industry is
identified. Quantitative data and observer notes could
be traceable to individuals and companies but should
be sanitized prior to the release of any reports.

4.5. Dedicated Research to Understand the Workforce Skill Set
JV has highlighted the need for dedicated research
to better understand today’s workforce skill sets,
determine how they need to evolve, and identify
gaps among them. For example, the energy, water,
chemical, and defense industrial base sectors rely
on ICSs that are becoming more connected to the
Internet. As these systems continue to modernize,
they will increasingly blend with the electromagnetic
spectrum and introduce new vulnerabilities. Training
a workforce in these blended environments will
continue to be a challenge for the United States.
Training must become more available and affordable.
With the advent of the IoT, the required skill sets
(i.e., the blending of cybersecurity in IT/OT and radio
frequency) related to these technologies have yet to
be identified. Though the skills necessary for securing
infrastructure may increasingly overlap within the
workforce, as malicious actors become increasingly
adept at remotely interacting with sensitive systems,
the differences among skill sets will become
more crucial.
Establish Educational Program/Job Duty Fit
Future research should attempt to establish a fit
between educational programs for and job duties
of participants. The cybersecurity landscape is
constantly changing, so ensuring training and
educational programs are in line with industry needs
is key to ensuring that a workforce is better prepared
without requiring extensive on-the-job training. As
technology’s reach expands and more devices become
automated, educational institutions may need to
adapt their educational programs to incorporate those
changes.
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APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS
ACI
ARCYBER

U.S. Army Cyber Institute
U.S. Army Cyber Command

C2
CCII

Command and control
Cybersecurity Control
Implementation Interface
Critical infrastructure and key
resources
Chief information officer
Citigroup
Citigroup Global Cyber Threat
Exercise Team
Cyber Mutual Assistance Workshop

CIKR
CIO
Citi
Citi-GCTET
CMAW
DCIP
DCOE
DHS
DIR
DoD
DOE
DPS
DSCA
DSCIR
EMAC
ENISA
EU
FBI
FEMA
FS-ISAC
FSARC

Defense Critical Infrastructure
Program
Defensive Cyberspace Operations
Element
Department of Homeland Security
Directorate of Information Resources
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Public Safety
Defense Support of Civil Authorities
Defense Support to Cyber Incident
Response
Emergency Management Assistance
Compact
European Union Agency for Network
and Information Security
European Union
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Emergency Management
Agency
Financial Services Information
Sharing and Analysis Center
Financial Systemic Analysis &
Resilience Center

G7

Group of Seven

ICS
IOC
IoT

Industrial control system
Indicator of compromise
Internet of things

IRA
IRP
ISAC
ISAO
ISP
IT
ITIL

Immediate Response Authority
Incident response plan
Information Sharing and
Analysis Center
Information Sharing and Analysis
Organization
Internet service provider
Information technology
Information Technology
Infrastructure Library

JV

Jack Voltaic

LFA
LFX

Lead federal agency
Live-fire exercise

NATO
NDAA
NICP
NIST
NYC

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
National Defense Authorization Act
NATO Industry Cyber Partnership
National Institute of Standards and
Technology
New York City

OSD
OT

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Operational technology

PCA
POC
PPP

Posse Comitatus Act
Point of contact
Public-private partnership

R&D

Research and development

SAD
SCADA

State Active Duty
Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition
U.S. Army Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command

SDDC
TREAS
TTX

Department of the Treasury
Tabletop exercise

USCYBERCOM U.S. Cyber Command
UTSA
University of Texas at San Antonio
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APPENDIX C: PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE RECOMMENDED LANGUAGE
A public affairs strategy must be in place prior to a cyberspace attack with cascading effects that impact
multiple sectors. It is critical to have a shared understanding of the correct messages and products and who the
release authority is for an actual, real-world crisis to ensure that responses are succinct and accurate and that
organizations are unified in releasing information to the public.
States should develop templates for press releases, products, and broad messaging that can be tailored later to
specific events. Examples of these broad messages include the following:
• Every day, the department of ______ is working diligently to respond to requests relating to its core tasks.
• The safety and security of our citizens is our top concern.
• Our responders are working around-the-clock to bring _______ back to our citizens. For more information on
how to help or provide our department with updates, please visit our website at ______ or call our hotline at
_______.

The ACI Public Affairs Office provided the following language to consider using when developing press releases:
• _________ will be in charge of updating the public during or immediately following the __________ incident
with a statement via social media.
• A more detailed press release/statement about the incident should be released within ___ hours of
the incident.
• Within ____ hours or days, a press conference will be held where ____ will address the following issues/
concerns about the incident.
• Within _____days or hours of the event, public affairs or public relations officials should hold a
synchronization meeting to ensure all parties, members, and organizations understand all details of the
incident and how to better assist the lead.
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APPENDIX D: JV-DRIVEN DEFENSE BILL PROVISION
JV’s strategic impact shows that the highest levels of government recognize the Nation’s need to establish
preparedness for inevitable national disasters and cyberspace attacks through these exercises. JV provides a
forum where stakeholders can meet in a low-threat environment to forge these critical relationships, instead of
waiting for a massive attack to occur to do so.
SEC. 1649. PILOT PROGRAM ON MODELING AND SIMULATION IN SUPPORT OF MILITARY HOMELAND
DEFENSE OPERATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH CYBER ATTACKS ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) PILOT PROGRAM REQUIRED.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security shall carry
out a pilot program to model cyber attacks on critical infrastructure in order to identify and develop
means of improving Department of Defense responses to requests for DSCA for such attacks.
(2) RESEARCH EXERCISES.—The pilot program shall source data from and include consideration of the ‘‘JV’’
research exercises conducted by the Army Cyber Institute, industry partners of the Institute, and the
cities of New York, New York, and Houston, Texas.
(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the pilot program shall be to accomplish the following:
(1) The development and demonstration of risk analysis methodologies, and the application of commercial
simulation and modeling capabilities, based on artificial intelligence and hyperscale cloud computing
technologies, as applicable—
(A) to assess defense critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and interdependencies to improve military
resiliency;
(B) to determine the likely effectiveness of attacks described in subsection (a)(1), and countermeasures,
tactics, and tools supporting responsive military homeland defense operations;
(C) to train personnel in incident response;
(D) to conduct exercises and test scenarios;
(E) to foster collaboration and learning between and among departments and agencies of the Federal
Government, State and local governments, and private entities responsible for critical infrastructure; and
(F) improve intra-agency and inter-agency coordination for consideration and approval of requests for
defense support to civil authorities.
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(2) The development and demonstration of the foundations for establishing and maintaining a program of
record for a shared high-fidelity, interactive, affordable, cloud-based modeling and simulation of critical
infrastructure systems and incident response capabilities that can simulate complex cyber and physical
attacks and disruptions on individual and multiple sectors on national, regional, State, and local scales.
(c) REPORT.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—At the same time the budget of the President for fiscal year 2021 is submitted to Congress
pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the Assistant Secretary shall, in consultation
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, submit to the congressional defense committees a report on
the pilot program.
(2) CONTENTS.—The report required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:
(A) A description of the results of the pilot program as of the date of the report.
(B) A description of the risk analysis methodologies and modeling and simulation capabilities developed
and demonstrated pursuant to the pilot program, and an assessment of the potential for future growth
of commercial technology in support of the homeland defense mission of the Department of Defense.
(C) Such recommendations as the Secretary considers appropriate regarding the establishment of
a program of record for the Department on further development and sustainment of risk analysis
methodologies and advanced, large-scale modeling and simulation on critical infrastructure and cyber
warfare.
(D) Lessons learned from the use of novel risk analysis methodologies and large-scale modeling and
simulation carried out under the pilot program regarding vulnerabilities, required capabilities, and
reconfigured force structure, coordination practices, and policy.
(E) Planned steps for implementing the lessons described in subparagraph (D).
(F) Any other matters the Secretary determines appropriate.

